General equilibrium asset pricing model: three applications to land markets by Park, Cheol Soo
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1991
General equilibrium asset pricing model: three
applications to land markets
Cheol Soo Park
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Park, Cheol Soo, "General equilibrium asset pricing model: three applications to land markets " (1991). Retrospective Theses and
Dissertations. 9567.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/9567
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfîhn master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order. 
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, IVtl 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600 

Order Number 9126285 
General equilibrium asset pricing model: Three applications to 
land markets 
Park, Cheol Soo, Ph.D. 
Iowa State University, 1991 
U M I  
300N.ZeebRd. 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 

General equilibrium asset pricing model: 
Three applications to land markets 
by 
Cheol SCO Park 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Economics 
Approved: 
iR harge op; Ma^y^-Woj^k
For the Major Department 
For the Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1991 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION iv 
ACKEN0WLE6EMENTS . V 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LAND MARKET 4 
THE DATA 9 
PART I. TESTS OF THE PRESENT VALUE MODEL IN 
AGGREGATE AND DISAGGREGATE LAND MARKETS 
1. INTRODUCTION 17 
2. A GENERAL MODEL 21 
3 . THE PRESENT VALUE MODEL 26 
4. TESTABLE RESTRICTIONS 28 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 30 
5.1. Unit Root Tests 3 0 
5.2. Cointegration Tests 4 6 
6. DISCUSSION 56 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 59 
PART II. THE SPATIAL LAND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
1. INTRODUCTION 64 
2. SPATIAL MARKETS EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS 66 
3. COINTEGRATION AND TESTING LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA 7 0 
iii 
3.1. Issue of Cointegration 70 
3.2. Tests for Cointegration 71 
3.3. Extent of Violation in Cointegration Relation ... 74 
3.4. The Restricted Multivariate Autoregressive Model 76 
3.5. The Reduced Model and Cointegration Tests 79 
4. SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES 81 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS - 95 
PART III. RETURN AND RISK IN LAND MARKETS: 
CROPSHARE CONTRACTS VS CASERENT CONTRACTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 98 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 101 
3. MODELS 110 
3.1. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 110 
3.2. Consumption CAPM 112 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 116 
4.1. Data and Estimation lis 
4.2. CAPM Results 124 
4.3. CCAPM Results 129 
4.4. Discussion 132 
5. CONCLUDING RLMARKS 134 
GENERAL SUMMARY 136 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 139 
iv 
DEDICATION 
To my parents. 
V 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my 
major professor. Dr. Peter Orazem, for his kind guidance and 
helpful suggestions during the writing of this dissertation. 
His insight and advice make me learn what the research is. I 
extend my appreciation to Dr. William Meyers for the advice 
and financial support throughout my graduate school years. I 
would also like to acknowledge the rest of my committee. Dr. 
Barry Falk, Dr. Michael Duffy, and Wayne Fuller for many 
valuable suggestions at various stages. 
Finally, I am very grateful for my wife Soon-Won Seol and 
family for their patience and encouragement. 
1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
After nearly 40 years of generally steady appreciation, 
Iowa farmland values increased fourfold from 1971 to 1981 and 
then plummeted 40 percent during the next five years. See 
Figure 1. More broadly, farmland prices in the United States 
have shown major cycles in values such as periods of sustained 
booms followed by sustained decline. The most recent cycle of 
farmland prices peaked in the early 1980s and the declined 
from 1981 through 1986. Because farmland represents the 
largest component of all assets committed to farming on the 
national level as well as in the state of Iowa, such cycles in 
farmland values play a large role in the financial well-being 
of the farm sector. Falk (1989b) argued that these cycles 
have real consequences, not only on landowners but also on 
tenant farmers, suppliers, lenders, and indeed whole 
communities which can last long after each cycle has run. 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the 
causes of the substantial cycles in land values, the spatial 
efficiency of land markets, and the extent of a risk premium 
in the farmland market. Specifically, hypothetical 
relationships between exogenous forces in the economy and the 
changes in the values of farmland will be identified and 
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empirically tested within a general equilibrium asset pricing 
framework. 
I will apply recently emerging financial and monetary 
theories of recursive structures to the land market where 
dynamic programming and nonstationary time series analysis are 
applicable in order to construct theories of asset (land) 
price determination, and spatial market efficiency. These 
theories will then be applied to data on the Iowa farmland 
market. 
The plan of this study is as follows. A brief 
description of the farmland market is given in the next 
section. Data sources, definitions, and the construction of 
related data used in this study will be introduced in the 
following section of this general introduction. 
Part I tests the present value model in aggregate and 
disaggregate land markets. This part reviews general 
equilibrium asset pricing theory to explain the determination 
of land prices as a solution to a constrained dynamic 
optimization problem. Subsequent sections in Part I derive 
and examine the testable restrictions from the present value 
model as a special case of the general solution. Empirical 
results and concluding remarks are given in the last two 
sections of Part I. 
The results of Part I provide mixed results; there exists 
evidence supporting a cointegration relationship in the 
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aggregate data but not in the disaggregate data in general. 
In Part II, the spatial market efficiency of farmland is 
investigated under the present value assumption in land 
prices. Section 2 of Part II discusses the spatial form of 
the market efficiency hypothesis applied to comovements of 
farmland prices. A definition and statistical test of 
cointegration, its implications for asset market efficiency, 
and an economic interpretation of the restricted multivariate 
model under the efficient market hypothesis are presented in 
the remaining sections. 
The results of Part II show mixed empirical support for 
the long run equilibrium relationship between land prices 
across farm regions. Testable implications of a long run 
relationship are more strongly supported between adjacent 
markets than between distinct markets. 
Part III deals with the return and risk in farmland 
markets. The first section reviews the literature and 
discusses some puzzling issues in land markets. In subsequent 
sections, the traditional capital asset pricing model and the 
consumption based asset pricing model are summarized. The 
remaining sections present the empirical results and 
conclusions. 
4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LAND MARKET 
The land market has distinctive features because of the 
peculiar characteristics of land. Farmland serves a two-fold 
purpose for a farmer. Farmers depend on the land for the 
production of crops or feed for livestock. Farmland is also a 
capital asset for the farmer. Much of agriculture's financial 
wealth is in land. 
There has been an active rental market in Iowa farmland^. 
Because land is a traded asset, land prices can be modeled in 
a general equilibrium optimization framework such as the Lucas 
tree model. These land markets are not necessarily fully 
efficient, however, since there does not exist a continuous 
market for given parcels of farmland. 
Iowa farmland is relatively homogeneous in terms of land 
use for crops such as corn, soybeans, and oats. However, it 
is heterogeneous in terms of soil productivity. Agricultural 
land varies widely across regions in soil type, topography, 
and climate condition such as rainfall. In this sense, land 
is a heterogeneous resource that varies greatly in quality. 
Land also can be made more productive per unit through 
^In 1987, approximately 43 percent of all U.S. farmland 
was rented (Murray R. Wise, 1989 p. 14). 
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increased application of fertilizer, labor, and a timely 
supply of water by investment in irrigation. An example of a 
soil map can be found in the modern county soil survey reports 
M-1268P, published by the Iowa State University Cooperative 
Extension Service since 1960. 
A better understanding of these characteristics can be 
achieved by contrasting the nature of the farmland market with 
markets for other assets and commodities^. For example, 
consider the market for shares of common stock. Thousands of 
identical shares of a firm's stock are traded each day. 
Because the shares are homogeneous, there are minute-by-minute 
or day-to-day updates of price at which the underlying stock 
is being traded. In the case of farmland, transactions of a 
given parcel are quite different from the day-to-day 
transactions of other financial assets or goods. A given acre 
of farmland may be sold only once in 10 years. Thus there is 
no continuous market giving information about the value of 
that particular parcel. 
The supply of farmland has remained relatively fixed over 
time. The relatively fixed supply of the land asset minimizes 
problems that arise in stock market studies due to stock 
splits or changes in the number of shares of a corporation's 
common stock. 
The demand for land may be thought of as the amount of 
^See Murray, Harris, Miller, and Thompson (1983, pp. 3 - 22). 
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land that users want and are willing to buy at various prices. 
The demand for land arises from the various direct and 
indirect uses to which it can be put. Direct demand for land 
results when land itself is used for consumption, such as use 
for recreation purpose or as residential sites. Most of the 
demand for land is a derived demand. Derived demand results 
from the productive potential of land, its location, or other 
advantages rather than the land itself. The total demand for 
land is the sum of the various direct and derived demands for 
land. 
Leasing and ownership are alternative methods of 
obtaining the use of farm real estate. A lease is a contract 
between a landlord and tenant concerning use of resources for 
a given time period and for a specified rent. There are three 
types of leases in farmland markets: the cropshare contracts, 
cashrent contracts, and a combination of cropshare and 
cashrent contracts. The most common type of lease reported is 
the cropshare contract, used by 44 percent of the owners and 
tenants surveyed. Cashrent contracts are used in about 37 
percent of leases while the remaining 19 percent use a 
combination of cropshare and cashrent contracts^. The 
predominant leasing method of the cropshare contract in the 
'see Survey of Iowa Farm Leasing Practices, FM-1811, 
Cooperative Extension Services, Iowa State University, 1983. 
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Midwest is the fifty/fifty cropshare^. In the case of the 
fifty/fifty cropshare contract, the landlord and tenant each 
share half the crop when harvested, and also share the risk of 
operation along with some of the production costs®. A 
cashrent leasing contract involves a cash payment by the 
tenant for the use of the property on an annual basis. 
A reasonably good first approximation of the returns to 
Iowa farmland ownership, aside from capital gains, can be 
derived both from observable market determined cashrents, and 
from artificially constructed cropshares^. 
Land is not a mobile asset. Normally, the seller only 
brings his property to the attention of a few potential 
buyers. Due to the limitations of the land markets, there are 
many small local markets for land in which buyers (or renters) 
and sellers (landlords) operate. A level of land values 
becomes established in each local market. This local land 
price reflects local demand and supply forces. Land prices, 
cashrents, and cropshares for Iowa's nine farmland districts, 
which are readily available, may provide a good approximation 
to the cross-sectional economic relationships among local Iowa 
^Murray R. Wise (1989, p. 135). 
^Duanaway and Morrow (1980, p. 40). Specific items of 
production cost associated with cropshare contract will be 
discussed in THE DATA section in detail. 
^The construction of artificial cropshare rents from 
farmland will be discussed in the following section, THE DATA. 
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farmland markets. The geographic distribution of farmland 
prices in Iowa will reflect both characteristics or structure 
of the local market and exogenous variables such as farm 
policies, population, the extent of community development, 
weather conditions, and the quality of soil. 
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THE DATA 
The data sources, and the definition, and construction of 
the variables for this study are briefly reviewed. The data 
used in this dissertation consist of fifty-four time series of 
annual data for the years 1950 through 1986. All data are 
based on Iowa farmland markets. 
Land Prices 
The time series of land prices per acre of Iowa farmland 
are published in the Iowa State University Extension Service's 
Iowa Land Value Series (1950-1986). Iowa farmland prices used 
in this study consist of ten land price time series, including 
one aggregate state-level price series and nine disaggregated 
district-level price series. Figure 1 contains the time 
series of the aggregate state-level land price series. 
Figures 2 and 3 contain local farmland price series across 
nine regions. 
Cropshare Rent 
Data on cropshares were not collected, so I developed a 
proxy measure of the annual return on a cropshare contract. I 
constructed the synthetic cropshare return series at the state 
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and district levels by combining available data as follows: 
Cropshare per acre (Dg^) 
= <p^ * (Crop revenue per acre) - * (Cost per acre) 
= 0, * TCR; - 02 * CT,, 
where 0, and 02 are the landlord's share of the returns and 
share of the costs, respectively. I set (0^,02) = (.5, .5), so 
only the 50/50 contract case is considered in this study^. 
TCR* is total (gross) crop revenues per acre from major crops 
such as corn, soybeans, and oats. CT^ is the cost per acre 
associated with the cropshare contract. Cost data at the 
district level were not available, so I used available state-
level costs instead. 
On the revenue side, gross crop revenue per acre was set 
equal to the sum of revenues generated from each major crop, 
divided by total acres harvested. In each year, revenue from 
corn is the price of Iowa corn times the corn yield per acre 
times corn acres harvested. Similarly, annual revenue from 
soybeans is the price of Iowa soybeans times the soybean yield 
per acre times soybean acres harvested. The formula for the 
crop revenue per acre can be summarized by: 
TCR.^ = E CRVj^ / E AHi^, 
CRVjj = AH,J * YDjt * PCjj, i = corn, soybeans, oats 
(<^1,02) ~ (0.35, 0) is also a commonly used contract. 
In this case, the landowner will receive 35% of the yield (or 
revenue) without paying any cost associated with crop 
production. 
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where TCR^ is the total (gross) crop revenue per acre from the 
major crops; CRVj is revenue obtained from crop i; AH. is the 
area harvested for crop i; YD, is the yield of crop i per 
acre; and PC, is the price of crop i. This gross revenue is 
split 50/50 if the underlying farmland is under the 50/50 
cropshare contract. The data on yields and area harvested were 
collected from the Iowa Crop & Livestock Reporting Service's 
publication Iowa Crops; County Estimates. Historic Series 
1950-77. Data for the remaining years was obtained from 
various editions of Iowa Agricultural Statistics. The Iowa 
crop prices were collected from the Iowa State University 
Cooperative Extension Services's publication Prices of Iowa 
Farm Products (1930-86). On the cost side of the 
cropshare contract, the landlord pays one-half of the variable 
costs excluding machinery and the tenant pays one-half of the 
variable cost but all labor and machinery. The landlord and 
tenant share equally in the crop input expenses. These 
expenses include seed, fertilizer & lime, hired labor, and 
miscellaneous expenses. Cost associated with the 50/50 
cropshare contract is estimated according to: 
</)2*CT^ (Cost) = 
0.5*{seed + fertilizer & lime + hired labor + miscellaneous}, 
where CT^ is the cost per acre associated with cropshare 
contract, and 02 ~ 0.5 is the assumed portion or share of cost 
borne by the landlord. The cost data were collected from the 
12 
Iowa Agricultural Statistics, published by the Iowa Crop and 
Livestock Reporting Service, Iowa Department of Agriculture, 
and The Farm Income. State Estimates; (1947-1970), published 
by the United States Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service. Figure 4 contains the time series of 
average state synthetic cropshare contracts. Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 contain examples of these synthetic cropshare 
contracts for representative districts. 
Cash Rent 
The time series of state-level cash rents are estimates 
produced by the Iowa Crop and Livestock Reporting Service 
based on their own surveys. Disaggregated district-level 
annual cash rents for the nine agricultural regions in Iowa 
are also produced in the same manner. Cashrent data are 
published by the USDA's Economic Research Service. These Iowa 
farmland cash rents are also available from the Iowa State 
University Extension Service's FM-1728 publications. 
Timing 
The price reported by Summary Data of the Iowa Land Value 
Survey for year t is an end of the period price. An end-of-
period land price seems to be consistent with a beginning-of-
period cashrent and an end-of-period cropshare rent because 
these land prices and rents provide contemporaneous measures 
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appropriate, for the underlying studies®. The Iowa Land Value 
Survey data are described in the Iowa State University 
Extension Service's FM-1825 publications. 
Price Deflator 
All the nominal land price, cropshare rent, and cash rent 
series were transformed into real terms, by dividing each 
series by the Consumer Price Index (1967 = 100). 
The data on land prices, cropshare rents and the price 
deflator were used to determine the annual real rate of return 
on land under a cropshare contract across nine local regions 
and the aggregate state level. I measure the real rate of 
cropshare return by 
where is the real rate of cropshare return from an acre of 
farmland; PL^ is the nominal farmland price per acre at time 
t; CPI; is the consumer price index at time t; Dg^ is the 
annual nominal dividend for the cropshare contract which is 
^Payment of cashrent may vary from operation to 
operation. For example, some cashrent contracts may require 
50 percent of the rent in the spring and 50 percent in the 
fall. 
Rate of Return on Land under Cropshare Contract 
1. 
(P, + d;, -
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equal to the constructed cropshare rent per acre; is the 
real farmland price per acre at time t; and dg^ is the real 
cropshare rent on land under contract. Figure 10 contains the 
time series of the rate of return on the average state 
synthetic 50/50 cropshare contracts. Figure 11 contains 
examples of these synthetic rates of return on land under 
50/50 cropshare contracts for representative local land 
markets. 
Rate of Return on Land under Cashrent Contract 
To construct rates of return on cashrent contracts in 
state and local land markets, I use times series on land 
prices, cashrents, and the price deflator. The annual rate of 
return on land under a cashrent contract (R^^) was computed as 
Ret = (Pt i) /^t-1 where is the real farmland price 
per acre at time t; and d^^ is the annual cashrent on land 
under contract. See Figure 12 for state rate of return on 
land under cashrent contact, and Figure 13 for rates of return 
on local lands under cashrent contracts from representative 
local markets. 
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The independent variables include a measure of market 
return on equity, risk free return, and real consumer 
expenditures per capita. 
A Measure of Market Return on Equity 
Market return on equity was measured by the average 
annual real return on Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Stock 
Price. This rate of return series was taken from Grossman and 
Shiller (1981) and extended to 1986 using their methodology. 
Risk-Free Return 
The risk-free rate of return was measured using interest 
rates on the nine-month U.S. Treasury Bills. The risk-free 
return will be used as a benchmark return from which excess 
returns to risky assets may be computed. Excess returns are 
measured as the simple difference between the return on a 
risky asset and the risk-free return. 
Per Capita Consumption 
In Part III, I will make use of a consumption based 
measure of the changes in wealth in the economy. For this 
purpose, consumption was measured by consumer expenditures on 
nondurables and services. These data are taken from the 
National Income and Product Accounts. The consumption data 
are divided by the total population to get per capita figures. 
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PART I. TESTS OF THE PRESENT VALUE MODEL IN 
AGGREGATE AND DISAGGREGATE LAND MARKETS 
17 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many studies of fluctuations in farmland prices have been 
conducted in the past'. The recent major cycle in farmland 
prices (the explosion of both land and commodity prices in the 
1970s followed by the rapid decline of land prices and the 
accompanying farm debt crisis in the early 1980s) stimulated a 
new round of research on the determination of farmland prices. 
Dramatic price fluctuations in asset markets, such as the 
market for farmland, are often difficult to reconcile with the 
commonly held belief in efficient markets. 
Many competing arguments have been advanced to explain 
the large fluctuations of land prices (for example, Reinsel 
and Reinsel (1979), Melichar (1979), Feldstein (1980), Phipps 
(1984), Alston (1986), Burt (1986), Shalit and Schmitz (1982), 
Castle and Hoch (1982), Rausser, Zilberman, and Karl (1988)). 
Substantial interest has been focused on determining whether 
the present value model of asset price determination is 
appropriate for understanding the forces underlying the 
dynamic behavior of land prices. It is commonly assumed that 
the value of the land is equal to the discounted present value 
' See Herdt and Cochrane (1966), Tweeten and Martin 
(1966). 
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of returns expected from the land^°. These papers focus on 
the role of current and expected future income to land 
ownership as exogenous forces underlying the stochastic 
behavior of land prices. 
Financial asset pricing theories developed over the past 
30 years have also been applied to land price movements. In 
the past ten years, the financial literature has provided 
procedures for evaluating the extent to which financial asset 
prices can be explained by current and expected future income. 
In other words, we can test formally whether the current asset 
price is equal to the present discounted value of projected 
future dividend payments associated with the ownership of the 
asset The notion that stock price behavior can be 
explained by the present value model focuses on the role of 
fundamentals which are associated with dividends. There is, 
however, a relatively large amount of literature that finds 
much of the variance in stock prices is not explained by 
dividends (for example, see Shiller (1981) and Campbell and 
Shiller (1987)). The other notion that stock price can be 
explained by speculative components such as bubbles suggests 
that stock prices deviate from the level implied by their 
^°One measure of the return attributed to land is the rent 
a tenant would pay to acquire control of the land. See 
Robinson, Lins, and Ven Kataraman (1985, p. 795). 
^^See, for example, West (1988a) . 
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underlying fundamental value. Recent studies of stock market 
price movements present evidence that bubbles do not play an 
important role in explaining the movement in stock prices. 
Using U.S. annual stock price data, Diba and Grossman (1988a) 
have provided evidence that supports the market fundamentals 
hypothesis. Using daily data taken for the year preceding the 
October 1987 crash across several countries, Dwyer and Hafer 
(1990) find little support for the implications of the 
hypothesis of rational bubbles in stock prices. Falk (1989b) 
argued that both financial markets and land markets face the 
same fundamental economic questions: excess volatility of 
asset prices. However, the past studies of farmland prices 
have only recently begun to take advantage of these 
statistical tests used in studying other assets. These recent 
developments in the study of nonstationary time series include 
Granger (1981), Granger and Weiss (1983), Engle and Granger 
(1987), Stock (1987), Phillips and Ouliaris (1987), and 
Johansen (1988) under the heading of 'cointegration' tests and 
Ahan and Reinsel (1987) for 'reduced rank regression' tests. 
Falk (1988a, b) recently applied some of the most recent 
statistical developments in the study of stock market price 
movements to study farmland prices using annual state-level 
Iowa farmland prices over the 1921-1986 sample period. Based 
on the residual based cointegration method of Engle and 
Granger (1987) , he found that aggregate data on farmland 
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prices was inconsistent with the presence of a rational bubble 
component in an asset's price behavior. 
Part II is organized as follows: The representative agent 
asset pricing model is set up in the next section. The 
present value model and a testable restriction will be derived 
from the general model in section 3 and 4. Section 5 presents 
the testing strategy and the empirical results. Results 
include the unit root test and the cointegration test. 
Section 6 discusses possible further explanations for results. 
Brief concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. 
21 
2. A GENERAL MODEL 
The general equilibrium asset pricing model has been 
extensively developed by others, but a variation of Lucas' 
(1978) asset pricing model is employed^^. Consider an economy 
with a representative agent. The representative agent gets 
utility from current and future stochastic consumption, given 
by the discounted expected utility function, 
EoSB^U(C,), 0 < a < 1, (1) 
where 6 is the agent's subjective discount factor, is 
aggregate real consumption at time t; and U(.) denotes the 
single period, time-additive utility function which is twice 
continuously differentiable, with U(0)=0. U(.) is strictly 
concave except in the case of linear utility (risk 
neutrality), in which case it is concave. E^f.) denotes the 
expectation operator, conditional on the information available 
to agents at time t. In each period, the consumer must decide 
how to allocate current income plus asset holdings between 
consumption and savings. Assume that the consumer maximizes 
(1) by choosing and A^ subject to the budget 
constraint: 
i^The optimization problem considered here is a special 
case of the one analyzed by Brock (1982) because our model 
excludes the aspect of production in the economy. 
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Ct + PA + Pft + FB„t.n/(l+int)" = (^t + + B^+ (2) 
where is the real price in period t (in terms of period t 
consumption) of a claim to the entire future stream of returns 
on an asset share. It is called the period t 'ex-dividend' 
price of the asset. is the amount of the asset held in 
period t. d^ is the real period t dividend (of nondurable 
good) . FB^ is the risk free asset holding at time t. 
=l/(l+i^j) is the price of the risk free asset. FBjt+j is the 
(nominal) amount of the j-period default free bonds purchased 
at time t-j, ij^ is the yield to maturity on a j-period bond. 
The maximization of (1) subject to (2) gives the interior 
intertemporal first-order conditions: 
C^: =  U' (Cj)  (3)  
A, :  Pt  =  E,  (Pt+i+ )  (4)  
FB 6,1, P,, = E, (5) 
Vt V (!+!„»)" = (6) 
where is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the 
budget constraint (2) and the reciprocal of one plus the j-
period nominal interest rate is interpreted as the j-period 
objective discount factor. Rearranging these conditions give 
stochastic Euler equations governing asset choices; 
U'(C,) P, = E,[6U'(C,+,) (P,+i+d,+,)] (7) 
U'(C,) P^, = fiE,U'(C,,,) (8) 
U'(C,) l/(l+i^J" = 6%[U'(C,,J] (9) 
Equation (7) is a first-order expectational difference 
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equation. The left-hand side of (7) is the foregone utility 
from current consumption that results from buying a unit of 
the asset, while the right-hand side gives the expected future 
consumption benefit derived from the dividend and capital 
value of the asset. Incorporating the market-clearing 
conditions on the Euler equations turns these equations into 
equilibrium asset pricing equations because the equilibrium 
requires that the endowment be consumed each period. 
Equivalently, by Walras' Law, market clearing conditions 
satisfy C^=d^, A^=l, FB^=0 for all t. In equilibrium, equation 
(7) implies 
P, U'(d,) = 6E,P^,,U'(d,,i) + BE,d,,^U'(d,+i) (10) 
Since equation (10) is linear in P^U'(d^), its forward 
iteration, using the law of iterated expectations, yields 
P, U'(d,) = S%P,,„U'(d,J + S6jE,d,,.U'(d,,.) (11) 
The general solution can be expressed as the sum of the term, 
Fç, representing the market-fundamental component, and an 
additional term, which is expected to grow geometrically 
at rate 1/fi. is interpreted as the speculative component 
of the asset price. 
P, = 1/U'(d,) SB'" E,[U'(d,„.)d,„.] + B,, 
P, = Ft + B, , (12) 
^Lucas (1978) proved the uniqueness of a rational 
expectations equilibrium based on contraction mapping. He 
ruled out multiple equilibria but did not preclude the 
possibility of non-stationary price paths with rational 
bubbles. 
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where 
Ft = 1/U'(d,) S3%[ U'(d,„.)d,„.] 
Bt = a%Pt+nU'(d,+J/U'(dt) 
(13) 
(14) 
Equation (13) is the fundamental solution and is referred to 
as the market-fundamental component of the asset price. This 
is a generalization of the familiar specification of market 
fundamentals, which equates the asset price to the present 
value of expected future dividends when U'(. ) is a constant. 
An implication of equation (13) is that the asset price is the 
present value of current and expected future dividends 
discounted by a time dependent discount rate, which is the 
product of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and 
the subjective discount factor. 
Under the assumption of rational expectations, equation 
(14) can be interpreted as a self-fulfilling expectation. 
This assumption of rational expectations restricts the process 
generating B^. By the law of iterated expectations, the 
expectation of B^^^ can be expressed as: 
Equation (15) implies that a speculative component is 
expected to grow exponentially at the rate . Solutions to 
equation (15) satisfy the stochastic difference equation; 
E,Bt,i = lim^ A%Pt+1+nU'(d,+i+J/U'(d,) 
= ((^t) ' where m=l+n 
= &^B (15) 
(16) 
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where is a random variable (or combination of random 
variables) with the property = 0. The characteristic of 
a speculative bubble is the particular size of its expected 
rate of growth and not necessarily its actual rate of 
growth^\ The expected rate of growth of a rational speculative 
bubble is such that agents or investors have no incentive to 
get out of the market, although they know the market is 
overvalued^. Why can such a speculative component exist? 
The intuitive reason is straightforward: arbitrage conditions 
in asset markets are expressed in terms of rates of return, 
not in terms of price levels. Therefore, even if an asset is 
overvalued by an amount, B^, it is still 'rational' for an 
agent to buy it, if the degree of overvaluation is expected to 
grow every period at the rate r. 
Theory cannot determine with precision the actual form 
of the bubble process. A multiplicity of bubble processes may 
exist. 
^Explaining why agents (investors) did not get out of an 
overvalued market is difficult and controversial. 
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3. THE PRESENT VALUE MODEL 
A particular specification of (12) concerns the standard 
present value model of asset pricing given by 
P, = (17) 
The price of land in period t depends on the expected 
future price and dividend payments d^^., from the next period 
and a constant ex ante real discount rate, fi. This difference 
equation reflects risk neutrality in this dynamic optimization 
framework because linear utility implies that the first 
derivative of the utility function, U'(.) is a constant, and 
the second derivative, U"(.)=0. If the representative agent 
is risk neutral, equation (17) reduces to the simpler 
specification of market fundamentals, which equates the asset 
price to the present value of expected future dividends. 
Assuming the existence of the transversality condition, a 
standard solution provides an optimal pricing function as a 
function of streams of future dividends with constant 
discounted value, 6, such that 
Pt = (18) 
The implication of this standard present value model is 
that the current asset price (or farmland price) is the 
present discounted value of currently expected future 
27 
endowments (or dividends or rents such as cashrent and 
cropshare rent). Models of this form include the expectations 
theory for interest rates (long-term yield and the one-period 
rate), the present value model of stock prices, and the 
permanent income theory of consumption'^. 
i^See Campbell and Shiller (1987, p. 1063). 
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4. TESTABLE RESTRICTIONS 
Consider equation (14) in the case of linearity in the 
utility function. Let fi equal l/(l+r), i.e., the subjective 
discount factor is equal to the objective discount factor. 
Let 0 = (l+r)/r so that 0(1-6)=1. Then equation (12) can be 
expressed as 
P, = e(l-6)i:fl'E,d,,,. + B, 
= 6EJd^ + 6d^^, + B^d^^g + B^d^+2 + •••) 
-0E,(6d, + + BM,,2 + bM,,3 + ...) 4- B, 
= 0Ejd^ + 0Ej(6Adj^, + B^Ad^+g + B^Ad^^j + ...) + B^ 
= 0dj + OBEtSB'Adj^j + B^ (19) 
Rearranging (19) yields 
Pt - ed^ = 06Ej2B'Ad^^. + B^ (20) 
An implication of equation (20) is that if the processes 
generating Ad^ are stationary or follow 1(1) (integrated of 
order 1) , and if B^ equals zero, then asset prices and 
dividends are cointegrated of order (1,1) with cointegrating 
vector (1, -8)17. dividends are first-difference 
i^If Xj and are a pair of 1(d) series, then it will be 
generally true that a linear combination, such as - aY^ 
will also be 1(d). However, it is possible that there exists 
a constant a such that follows I(d-b), b>0. When this 
happens, the pair of variables X^ and Y will said to be 
cointegrated and denoted (X , Y J ~ CI(d,b). See Granger and 
Newbold (1986), Stock (1987). 
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stationary, and a speculative component such as a rational 
bubble does not exist, then the sum given by the right-hand 
side of equation (20) is stationary. Thus, although the asset 
price series P^, and the dividend series d^, are nonstationary, 
their linear combination, - Bd^, is stationary. A testable 
restriction for the present value representation of land 
prices is that there exists one cointegration between land 
prices and land rents (the dividend on land ownership). The 
failure of the present value model of land prices can be 
detected by evidence of no cointegration among the variables. 
In this case, one possible reason for the present value model 
to fail could be the existence of speculative components in 
land prices such as rational bubbles or fads. When a 
speculative component is not added to the asset price in 
equation (20), the implication for a projection of the asset 
price on dividends holds. Otherwise, this implication does 
not hold. If the speculative parts are an important component 
of the observed asset price, the asset price will not be 
cointegrated with dividends. Since the bubble part of the 
price is independent of the dividend by assumption, it appears 
in the form of the residual of equation (20). Hence, the 
estimated residuals in equation (20) increase with time due to 
the bubble, and have a root greater than one. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We tested the model for farmland using time-series data 
for real annual prices and rents on both cash rent and 
cropshare contracts. The models cover both aggregate and 
disaggregate land prices. 
5.1. Unit Root Tests 
The first issue is to test for the existence of unit 
roots in farmland prices, cash rent, and cropshare rent as 
discussed in the previous sections. This is an important 
procedure because our approach requires that variables 
considered are integrated of order one. I performed the 
formal tests of the stationarity of farmland price, cropshare 
rent, and cashrent using time series data from state of Iowa 
as a whole and the nine agricultural regions which Iowa is 
commonly divided into (districts). The hypothesis that (or 
dgj, dgj is integrated of order one against the alternative 
that the series is integrated of order zero can be tested 
using the Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. These tests are 
presented in Tables I.l, 1.2, and 1.3 for real farmland 
prices, cashrent per acre, and cropshare per acre, 
respectively. The unit root tests are reported from estimated 
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regressions of the form: 
aX^ = a + fit + pXj., + <SaX^., + U; 
where X^ is the time series in question; t, a time trend; a, 
the first difference operator; and a, R, p, and S are 
parameters. Using the time series of land prices, cropshare, 
and cashrent, I fit the above model with a time trend and 
without a time trend. One lag of aX^ appears to be necessary 
to make the errors serially independent. The reported r-'s 
are the autocorrelations of the residuals from the model 
estimated. Comparison of the sample autocorrelations of the 
residuals with bounds ± 2n'^^^, which is suggested by Granger 
and Newbold (1986, p. 99), provides a standard for model 
adequacy. The residual autocorrelations do not seem 
excessively large and provide grounds for a diagnostic check 
on the adequacy of the fitted model. 
I report test statistics that are based on the t 
statistic on the lagged level in a Dickey-Fuller regression. 
The test statistics, t^ , are computed as the ratio of p, the 
OLS coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable, to 
its standard error. The corresponding t statistics are t^ , 
Tyin the model with and without trend, respectively. The 
critical values for t^ , are given in Fuller (1976, p. 373). 
The null hypothesis that p = 0 and 6=0 cannot be rejected at 
the ten percent level in any of these cases, whether or not 
the time trend is included in the regression. Thus the real 
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farmland price, cashrent, and cropshare appear to be 
integrated of order one, that is, nonstationary in levels. 
The finding of a unit root for farmland prices, cashrent, and 
cropshare series is consistent with the hypothesis of 
cointegration among those series because the real land price 
series could possibly be related to the unit root component of 
real dividends series such as cash rent and/or cropshare 
series. 
I also applied Hasza-Fuller tests of the null hypothesis 
that Pj is integrated of order two, and thus has two unit 
roots, against the alternative hypothesis that is 
integrated of order zero or one. Two unit roots tests are 
reported from the estimated regressions of the form: 
A^Pt = a + At + pP^.i + <SAPj.^ + i YiAP^.j + u, 
i=2 
where P^ is the real farmland prices per acre; t, a time 
trend; A, A^, the first and second difference operator; and a, 
B, p, Y-, and S are parameters. Including the constant a 
allows drift in the first difference of price. The model is 
estimated with one lagged first difference, consistent with 
the form used in the tests above. The test is repeated with 
three lagged differences of prices to remove some apparent 
serial correlation in the residuals. Beside the above model, 
I fit two other models. One model imposes the a priori 
restriction that 8=0. The other model imposes the a priori 
restriction that a=A=0. The results of these tests are 
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presented in Table 1.4. Five test statistics, ($3( 4 ) ,  $ 3 ( 2 ) ,  
#2(3), $2(2)' $i(2)) defined in Hasza and Fuller (1979)^®, are 
calculated from the three regression models for testing the 
five null hypotheses. Critical values for the test statistics 
are given in Hasza and Fuller (1979, p. 1116). Results 
including the trend seem to be sensitive to the number of 
lagged first order differences of the dependent variable. The 
results excluding the trend and constraining the constant to 
be zero are less sensitive to the lag specification. On the 
margin, the size and the pattern of rapid decay of the 
autocorrelation coefficients indicate that the residual errors 
from the model with three lags of first order difference of 
price are serially independent. The tests using the three 
lagged differences are consistent across all five tests. The 
null hypotheses are rejected at the ten percent level. In 
general, the results support that land prices are 
nonstationary in their levels but are stationary in their 
first differences. This provides evidence against the 
presence of a rational bubble in farmland prices in the 
regions considered here. 
(2) is the nonstationary analogous F-statisics defined 
in Hasza and Fuller (1979 p. 1110) to test hypothesis: 
(p,5)=(0,0) under the model with a priori restriction, a=6=0. 
$2(3) and $2(2) denote the analogous test statistics for the 
hypotheses (p,6,a)=(0,0,0) and (p,5)=(0,0) for the model with 
restriction (6=0). $3(4) and $3(2) denote the test statistics 
for the hypotheses (p,a,a,G)=(0,0,0,0) and (p,f)=(0,0) for the 
model without priori restriction. 
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Table I.l. Test for a unit root in farmland price series® 
Regions = a + fît + pP^.^ + 6AP^_^ + u^ 
p a fi <S T r, r^ r^'' 
1. Northwest 
-0.085 0.438 - 0.628 -1.818 -0.20 0.12 0.18 0.07^ 
(0.05)d (0.27) (0.14) 
-0.125 -24.13 0.013 0.678 -1.748 -0.25 0.11 0.14 0.07^ 
(0.07) (33.21) (0.02) (0.16) 
2. Northcentral 
-0.075 0.398 - 0.685 -1.846 -0.26 0.16 0.27 -0.2= 
(0.04) (0.25) (0.13) 
-0.109 -23.35 0.012 0.738 -1.659 -0.30 0.14 0.25 -0.2^ 
(0.07) (35.65) (0.02) (0.16) 
3. Northeast 
-0.073 0.292 - 0.665 -1.794 -0.28 0.24 0.25 -0.17= 
(0.04) (0.19) (0.13) 
-0.109 -17.88 0.009 0.707 -1.523 -0.26 -0.11 0.29 -0.13^ 
(0.07) (29.22) (0.02) (0.16) 
® The distributions of t^ , t^, which is equal to p divided 
by its standard error, under Hg are given in Fuller (1976, p. 
373). The null hypothesis that p = 0 and 5=0 cannot be 
rejected at the ten percent level in any of these cases. The 
distribution of t under the null hypothesis is given in Fuller 
(1979, p. 373). 
^ rj's are the autocorrelations of the residuals from the 
model estimated. 
^Comparison of the sample autocorrelations of the 
residuals with bounds ± 2n'*/^ « 0.333, which is suggested by 
Granger and Newbold (1986, p. 99), provides a standard for 
model adequacy. The residuals' autocorrelations do not seem 
excessively large and provide a ground for a diagnostic check 
on the adequacy of the fitted model. 
^The standard errors are in parentheses. Notation used 
here is P^; real farmland price per acre. 
Table I.l. (Continued) 
Regions aP^ = a + Bt + pP^.^ + «JaP^., + 
P a fl 5 T r, rj rj 
4. Westeast 
-0.073 0.292 - 0.656 -1.794 -0.29 0.24 0.25 -0.17^ 
(0.04) (0.19) (0.14) 
-0.109 -17.88 0.009 0.707 -1.523 -0.31 0.22 0.23 -0.18= 
(0.07) (29.22) (0.02) (0.16) 
5. Central 
-0.078 0,416 - 0.609 -1.670 -0.23 0.16 0.29 -0.20= 
(0.05) (0.29) (0.14) 
-0.101 -13.99 0.007 0.644 -1.361 -0.26 0.15 0.27 -0.21= 
(0.07) (35.99) (0.02) (0.17) 
6. Eastcentral 
-0.071 0.34 - 0.661 -1.678 -0.29 0.18 0.30 -0.22= 
(0.04) (0.24) (0.14) 
-0.093 -11.29 0.007 0.690 -1.237 -0.31 0.17 0.29 -0.23= 
(0.08) (32.34) (0.02) (0.17) 
7. Southwest 
-0.079 0.26 - 0.743 -2.002 -0.18 -0.01 0.23 0.14= 
(0.04) (0.15) (0.12) 
-0.126 -15.55 0.008 0.815 -2.006 -0.24 -0.04 0.20 0.15= 
(0.06) (16.39) (0.01) (0.15) 
8. Southcentral 
-0.072 0.17 - 0.743 -1.724 -0.24 0.23 0.18 -0.19= 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.12) 
-0.098 -6.52 0.003 0.711 -1.382 -0.28 0.23 0.18 -0.21= 
(0.07) (14.69) (0.01) (0.16) 
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Table I.l. (Continued) 
Regions = a + fit + pP^., + + u^ 
P a f i  S  T ri r. ^3 
9. Southeast 
-0.105 0.39 0.376 -2.670 -0.02 0.07 -•0 .02 -0.18= 
(0.04) (0.18) (0.15) 
-0.098 -7.12 0.003 0.69 -1.337 -0.32 0.31 0 .03 -0.12^ 
(0.07) (22.18) (0.01) (0.16) 
10. State 
-0.107 0.45 0.421 -1.867 -0.11 0.01 0 .25 -O.lic 
(0.04) (0.18) (0.15) 
-0.111 -17.82 0.009 0.757 -1.708 -0.24 0.19 0 . 19 -0.17= 
(0.07) (25.38) (0.01) (0.15) 
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Table 1.2. Test for a unit root in cropshare rent series® 
Regions Adg^ = a + fit + pdg^., + "^Adg^., + u^ 
p a  fi S  t r^ rj rj r^^ 
1. Northwest 
-0.369 0.095 
(0.17)c (0.05) 
-0.361 1.157 
(0.17) (2.79) 
2. Northcentral 
-0.285 0.079 
(0.15) (0.04) 
-0.276 1.646 
(0.15) (2.39) 
3. Northeast 
-0.321 0.081 
(0.16) (0.04) 
-0.316 0.993 
(0.16) (2.26) 
— —0.053 
(0.18) 
0.013 -0,062 
(0.02) (0.19) 
— —0.015 
(0.18) 
-0.001 -0.032 
(0.001) (0.19) 
— —0.029 
(0.18) 
0.001 -0.039 
0.001) f0.19i 
-2.228 0.01 
-2.129 0.01 
-1.923 0.01 
-1.839 0.01 
-2.060 -0.01 
-1.992 -0.01 
0.08 -0.18 0.12 
0.07 -0.18 0.12 
0.08 -0.11 0.08 
0.06 -0.11 0.06 
0.06 -0.07 0.14 
0.06 -0.07 -0.18 
® The distribution of t, which is equal to p divided by 
its standard error, under Hq is given in Fuller (1976, p. 
373). The null hypothesis is that p = 0 and fi = 0 cannot be 
rejected at the ten percent level in any of these cases. The 
distribution of t under the null hypothesis is given in Fuller 
(1979, p. 373). 
Tj's are the autocorrelations of the residuals from the 
model estimated. Comparison of the sample autocorrelations of 
the residuals with bounds ± 2n"^'^ « 0.333, which is suggested 
by Granger and Newbold (1986, p. 99), provides a standard for 
model adequacy. The residuals' autocorrelations do not seem 
excessively large and provide a ground for a diagnostic check 
on the adequacy of the fitted model. 
'^The standard errors are in parentheses. Notation used 
here is dg^: real cropshare per acre. 
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Table 1.2. (Continued) 
Regions Adg^ = a + fit + pdg^.^ + 6Adg^.^ + u^ 
P o c  B  S  T  r, Tg r^'' 
4. Westeast 
-0.429 0.105 
(0.17)c (0.04) 
-0.433 1.680 
(0.17) (2.49) 
5. Central 
-0.356 0.104 
(0.16) (0.05) 
-0.353 1.642 
(0.16) (2.72) 
6. Eastcentral 
-0.275 0.079 
(0.16) (0.05) 
-0.285 2.022 
(0.16) (2.40) 
0.085 
(0.18) 
0.001 0.082 
(0.001) (0.18) 
0.048 
(0.18) 
0.001 0.038 
(0.001) (0.19) 
-0.088 
(0.19) 
0.001 -0.285 
(0.001) (0.16) 
—2.564 —0.01 
-2.561 0.01 
-2.208 -0.02 
-2.159 -0.01 
-1.734 -0.02 
-1.778 -0.01 
0.04 -0.07 -0.04 
0.04 -0.07 -0.43 
0.06 0.01 -0.28 
0.05 0.01 -0.29 
0.16 -0.11 -0.03 
0.15 -0.12 -0.04 
7. Southwest 
-0.506 0.116 - -0.267 
(0.21) (0.05) (0.17) 
-0.521 2.340 -0.001 -0.261 
(0.21) (2.87) (0.001) (0.18) 
-2.402 -0.02 -0.03 0.18 -0.04 
-2.448 -0.01 -0.03 0.17 -0.04 
8. Southcentral 
-0.449 0.090 - -0.273 -2.243 -0.01 0.03 0.14 -0.32 
(0.20) (0.04) (0.17) 
-0.476 2.432 -0.001 -0.476 -2.344 -0.01 0.03 0.13 -0.33 
(0.20) (2.63) (0.001) (0.20) 
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Table 1.2. (Continued) 
Regions Adgj = a + fit + pdg^., + 
P a  B  S  T ri r; ^3 
9. Southeast 
-0.287 
(0.16) 
-0.281 
(0.16) 
0 . 0 7 6  
(0.05) 
1.664 
(2.54) 
-0.119 -1.822 
(0.14) 
-0.001 -0.281 -1.755 
(0.001) (0.16) 
0.01 0.07 
0.01 0.05 
0.04 
0.02 
-0.17 
-0.18 
10. State 
-0.304 
(0.15) 
-0.301 
(0.15) 
0.079 
(0.04) 
1.575 
(2.28) 
0.004 -2.003 
(0.18) 
-0.001 -0.301 -1.962 
(0.001) (0.15) 
0.003 0.08 
0.01 0.07 -
-0.08 
•0.09 
—0. 05 
-0.062 
40 
Table 1.3. Test for a unit root in cashrent series* 
Regions = a + 6t + f Ad^^.^ + u^ 
p a B 6 t r^  rg rj r^ '' 
1. Northwest 
-0.048 0.018 
(0.05)'= (0.01) 
-0.19 -2.504 
(0.12) (2.04) 
— —0.034 
(0.19) 
0.001 0.033 
(0.001) (0.19) 
-0.972 0.02 
-1.525 -0.01 
0.21 0.14 -0.12 
0.23 0.14 -0.13 
. Northcentral 
-0.039 0.015 - 0.437 -1.265 -0.04 0.12 -0.06 -0.11 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.18) 
-0.223 -4,069 0.002 0.533 -2.122 -0.13 0.14 -0.01 -0.05 
(0.11) (2.24) (0.001) (0.12) 
. Northeast 
-0.054 0.018 - 0.386 -1.394 -0.01 0.14 -0.28 -0.16 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.19) 
-0.371 -5.941 0.003 0.536 -2.662 -0.13 0.21 -0.18 -0.05 
(0.14) (2.53) (0.001) (0.19) 
° The distribution of t, which is equal to p divided by 
its standard error, under H» is given in Fuller (1976, p. 
373) . The null hypothesis is that p = 0 and 6 = 0 cannot be 
rejected at the ten percent level in any of these cases. The 
distribution of t under the null hypothesis is given in Fuller 
(1979, p. 373). 
b r^'s are the autocorrelations of the residuals. 
Comparison of the sample autocorrelations of the residuals 
with bounds ± 2n'^/^ « 0.343, which is suggested by Granger and 
Newbold (1986, p. 99), provides a standard for model adequacy. 
The residuals' autocorrelations do not seem excessively large 
and provide a ground for a diagnostic check on the adequacy of 
the fitted model. 
"^The standard errors are in parentheses. Notation used 
here is dg^: real cashrents per acre. 
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Table 1.3. (Continued) 
Regions Ad^^ = a + fit + pd^^.^ + f Ad^^.^ + u^ 
p a 6 S  T r, Tg T; r^'' 
4. Westeast 
-0.056 0.021 - -0.178 -1.059 0.02 0.18 0.11 -0.09 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.19) 
-0.212 -2.842 0.001 -0.096 -1.306 0.02 0.22 0.11 -0.08 
(0.16) (2.82) (0.001) (0.20) 
5. Central 
-0.041 0.018 - 0.179 -1.137 -0.06 0.34 -0.19 -0.04 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.18) 
-0.159 -2.698 0.001 0.246 -1.333 -0.10 0.37 -0.16 -0.004 
(0.12) (2.63) (0.001) (0.19) 
6. Eastcentral 
-0.036 0.014 - 0.309 -1.013 -0.03 0.12 0.09 -0.22 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.18) 
-0.191 -3.250 0.001 -0.191 -1.911 -0.09 0.13 0.13 -0.21 
(0.10) (1.98) (0.001) (0.16) 
7. Southwest 
-0.047 0.014 - 0.057 -1.007 -0.02 0.03 0.36 -0.12 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.19) 
-0.177 -2.374 0.001 0.113 -1.396 -0.02 0.05 0.36 -0.14 
(0.13) (1.98) (0.001) (0.19) 
8. Southcentral 
-0.055 0.015 - -0.199 -1.192 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.05 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.18) 
-0.123 -1.023 0.001 -0.158 -0.650 0.04 0.27 0.02 0.04 
(0.19) (2.82) (0.001) (0.21) 
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Table 1.3. (Continued) 
Regions Adg^ = a + Bt + pdg^_^ + «îAdg^.^ + u^ 
p a 6 6 T r, r2 rj 
, Southeast 
-0.056 0.022 - -0.165 -1.130 0.002 0.01 0.11 -0.03 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.19) 
-0.264 -4.267 0.002 -0.264 -1.400 0.009 0.08 0.12 -0.03 
(0.19) (3.76) (0.001) (0.19) 
10. State 
-0.036 0.013 - 0.369 -1.151 -0.065 0.14 0.10 -0.20 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.18) 
-0.177 -2.648 0.001 0.442 -1.702 -0.121 0.15 0.14 -0.17 
(0.10) (1.879) (0.001) (0.19) 
43 
Table 1.4. Testing for two unit roots in farmland price 
series® 
Regions = a + fit + pP^., + 6AP^.^ + L YjAP^.,. + u^ 
i=2 
A priori 
restrictions Hq r^ r^ r^"^ 
1. Northwest 
None 
0
 I
I 1 II <o II Q. $3(4): 4.31 5.69* —0. 06 -0 . 04 0.02 
P=(S=0 $3( 2 ) :  6.45 13.64*** 
A = 0 p=S=oc=0 *2(3): 6.28** 5.33** 0 . 0 1  0. .06 0.12 
P=(S=0 $2( 2 ) :  6.28** 10.22*** 
a=6=0 p=5=0 # i ( 2 ) :  4.78** 5.48** 0.01 0. 07 0.16 
Northcentral 
None p—S—Û!—6—0 $3(4) : 3.64 5.78** 0.04 -•0. 06 -0.02 
o
 
II «
0 II Q. $3( 2 ) :  5.42 13.66*** 
a = 0 O 
II a
 
II «
0 II Q. 
*2(3): 5.3 3** 5.20** 0.06 0. 08 0.13 
p=5=0 $2( 2 ) ;  5.33 9.86***  
a=R=0 p=5=0 $ i ( 2 ) :  3.93** 5.33** 0.02 0. 10 0.19 
° Hasza and Fuller tests for two unit roots. Critical 
values for the test statistic $ under HQ are given in Hasza 
and Fuller (1979, p. 1116). Three (two, one) asterisks imply 
rejection of Hq at the one (five, ten) percent level. 
Test statistics from the model with 1 lag of AP^. 
Test statistics from the model with 3 lags of AP^, where 
residuals are not serially correlated. 
^ rj's are the autocorrelations of the residuals from the 
estimated model with 3 lags of AP^. Notation used here is P^; 
real farmland price per acre. 
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Table 1.4. (Continued) 
A priori 
restrictions « 0  ^2 ^3'' 
3. Northeast 
None p = f=@=6: 
p=f=0 
=0 §3(4) :  
$ 3 ( 2 ) :  
3.73 
5.49 
8.60*** 
20.33*** 
0.002 -0.05 0.05 
6 = 0 p=<S=a=0 
p=5=0 
$2(3):  
*2( 2 ) :  
5.51** 
5.51* 
6.75*** 0.09 0.12 0.16 
12.64*** 
a=R=0 p=S=Q * i ( 2 ) :  4.11** 7.07*** 0.03 0.14 0.21 
4. Westcentral 
None p=S=a=R= 
p=S=0 
=0 $ 3 ( 4 ) :  
$ 3 ( 2 ) :  
4.11 
6.15 
6.45** 
15.06*** 
-0.02 -0.04 0.09 
6 = 0 p=S=a=0 
p=S=0 
$2(3):  
$ 2 ( 2 ) :  
5.92** 
5.92* 
5.59** 
10.36*** 
0.05 0.09 0.19 
Û!=6=0 p=S=0 $i(2): 4.25** 4.94** 0.009 0.01 0.02 
5 .  Central 
None p=6=a=6= 
p=6=0 
=0 $3(4):  
$ 3 ( 2 ) :  
3.99 
5.95 
6.39** 
15.64*** 
0.02 -0.06 0.02 
8 = 0 p=6=a=0 
p=<S=0 
*2(3): 
$2(2): 
6.07** 
6.07* 
6.29** 
13.37*** 
0.07 0.07 0.14 
0!=J3=0 p=6=0 $ l ( 2 ) :  4.86** 7.26*** 0.05 0.10 0.19 
6. Eastcentral 
None p=5=a=6= 
p=f=0 
0 $3(4):  
* 3 ( 2 ) :  
3.27 
4.74 
7.96*** 
19.09*** 
0.06 -0.002 0.05 
6 = 0 P = 5 = Q!=0 
p=5=0 
*2(3): 
$ 2 ( 2 ) :  
4.96** 
4.96 
7.93*** 
15.44*** 
0.11 0.13 0.15 
a=6=0 p=5=0 # i ( 2 ) :  3.82** 8.27*** 0.08 0.18 0.23 
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Table 1.4. (Continued) 
A priori 
restrictions Ho r^ rg rjd 
7. Southwest 
None p=(S=@=6-
p=<S=0 
=0 «3(4) : 
$3(2): 
3.68 
5.46 
4.40 -
9.87* 
•0.05 0.03 0.03 
6 = 0 p=<5=@=0 
p=<S=0 
$2(3): 
#2(2): 
5. 06 
5.06 
4.94** 
7 .16** 
0.01 0.08 0.01 
@=6=0 p=<J=0 $i(2): 3.31 2.94* 0.01 0.06 0.18 
8. Southcentral 
None p=«5=a=6= 
p=<S=0 
=0 $3(4): 
$3(2): 
3.48 
5.14 
8.52*** 
18.21*** 
0.07 0.09 0.05 
6 = 0 p=5=a=0 
p=5=0 
$2(3): 
$ 2 ( 2 ) :  
5.25** 
5.25 
6.77*** 
11.21** 
0.04 0.17 0.14 
@=6=0 p=<S=0 $i(2): 3.99** 5.83*** -0.02 0.18 0.02 
9. Southeast 
None p=5=a=6= 
p=d=0 
=0 $3( 4 )  :  
$3( 2 ) :  
3.51 
5.20 
5.21* 
10.09* 
0.01 -0.03 -0.18 
v>
> II o
 p=5=a=0 
p=5=0 
$2(3): 
$2(2): 
5.36** 
5.36 
5.55** 
8.4 2** 
0.009 0.08 -0.05 
@=6=0 p=<J=0 $i(2): 4. 06** 5.03** -0.04 0.12 0.02 
10. State 
None p=6=@=6= 
p=5=0 
0 $3(4): 
$3(2): 
3.59 6.40" 
3.52 14.78*** 
0.03 -0.02 0.03 
6 = 0 p=(S=a=0 
p=5=0 
$2(3): 
$2(2): 
5.20** 
5.20 
5.58** 
10.24*** 
0.07 0.12 0.16 
@=6=0 p=<S=0 $ i ( 2 ) :  3.70** 5.08** 0.01 0.03 0.21 
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5.2. Cointegration Tests 
The present value model implies that farmland and rents 
are cointegrated of order (1, -0) if the first differences of 
rents from farmlands are stationary and if the rational 
component in land prices does not exist. In other words, 
evidence that farmland prices and rents are cointegrated would 
be evidence against the existence of a rational bubble 
component in farmland prices. However, the failure to 
demonstrate cointegration between land prices and rents will 
not necessarily establish the existence of a rational bubble 
component. 
Engle and Granger (1987) describe how one cointegrating 
factor can be found through a two step procedure. Engle and 
Granger's procedure is to first estimate the cointegrating 
vector by OLS. Stock (1984) has demonstrated that when two 
variables are cointegrated, OLS estimates of the cointegrating 
vector, 0, are consistent and highly efficient. Estimated 
residuals from the cointegration equation are then used to 
test the null hypothesis that land prices (P^) and rents (dg^, 
dj.^) are not cointegrated. This requires the absence of a unit 
root in the residual series of the cointegrating regression. 
The results of estimating cointegrating regressions for 
land prices and rents, including both cashrent and cropshare 
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rent, as well as the unit root tests on the residuals of these 
regressions are reported in Tables I.5-1.7. For each district 
and for the state, three tests of cointegration—the 
cointegration regression Durbin-Watson statistics (CRDW), 
Dickey-Fuller, and Augmented Dickey-Fuller(ADF) statistics are 
provided. Among those three statistics, I used the ADF 
statistic to test the cointegration relationship because Engle 
and Granger (1987, p. 269) recommended the ADF test as a more 
powerful test than the other tests, based on Monte Carlo 
simulations of the stability of critical values. The null 
hypothesis tested is that real land prices and real rents per 
acre (cashrent and cropshare rent contracts) are not 
cointegrated. The test statistics are computed from results 
of two regression equations. The cointegrating regression of 
price (rents) on rents (prices) yields OLS residuals. Using 
those residuals. Augmented Dicky-Fuller unit root test 
statistics are computed. The order of lags is set to ensure 
that the estimated residual series is serially uncorrelated. 
Engle and Granger's test for no cointegration, based on the 
residual from the cointegrating regression, gives mixed 
results: the ADF statistic in the state level model rejects 
the null hypothesis at the 10% level, while all the ADF 
statistics in the district-level model fail to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 10 percent level. At the aggregate level, 
there is evidence for cointegration between farmland prices 
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and rents in the cash rent contract, but not for cropshare 
rent and land prices. Evidence for cointegration between real 
land prices and rents become stronger when we perform tests 
for cointegration among farmland prices, cashrents, and 
cropshares in the aggregate level. By allowing different 
sample sizes and different numbers of variables in the 
procedure of Engle and Granger (1987), Engle and Yoo (1987) 
have calculated critical values for the multivariate case, 
based on Monte Carlo methods. The ADF statistic has critical 
values of 2.84 (3.17) at the 10 (5) percent significance 
level. The ADF statistic in Table 1.7 strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration among real land prices, 
cashrents, and cropshare rents in the aggregate level data. 
However, when the same tests are applied to the dissaggregate 
data, most tests fail to reject the null hypothesis, using 
cashrent contract, cropshare contract, and the mixture of two 
contracts. 
The results in Tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 imply that a 
speculative component such as a rational bubble does not 
appear in the aggregate farmland market. However, there is 
less evidence supporting cointegration in the disaggregate 
land markets. The nonexistence of a cointegration 
relationship between land prices and rents in local markets 
does not imply the converse hypothesis. That is, failure to 
find cointegrations in disaggregated local markets does not 
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necessarily provide evidence of the existence of a 'rational' 
speculative component in local farmland prices. Contradictory 
results between aggregate and disaggregate data require 
further comment. One interpretation of these mixed results 
between the aggregate data and the disaggregate data may fall 
into the measurement error context. The consistency of the 
findings tend to lower the likelihood that the results are due 
to random measurement errors or to chance. One alternative is 
that there might exist micro irrational bubbles or fads at the 
micro level which are washed out in the global or aggregate 
market. This latter possibility is discussed in the next 
section. 
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Table 1.5. The cointegration test for land prices and 
cashrents® 
Cointegrating Regression:" 
Pt-1 = Co + Gcdc, + V; 
Models Cp 8 g RZ CRDW DF ADF Value® 
Disaaareaated Models 
1. Northwest -1.85 
(0.62) 
27.02 
(2.21) 
0. 82 0. 51 -2 . 31 -2 .56 
2 . Northcentral -1.59 
(0.59) 
24.13 
(1.89) 
0. 84 0. 34 -1. 83 -2 .37 
3. Northeast -1.72 
(0.56) 
20.95 
(1.91) 
0. 79 0. 31 -1. 79 -2 .57 
4. Westcentral -0.51 
(0.55) 
18.70 
(1.94) 
0. 74 0. 43 -2. 07 -2 .57 
®The null hypothesis is that the series of the 
cointegration residual is 1(1). 
''Since the farmland price reported for year t by the Iowa 
Land Value Survey is a fourth quarter of the year (November of 
year t) price, and d^^ are used to take care of 
contemporaneous measurement for two series. 
® ADF is the t-statistic for 0 in the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller regression: 
AV^ = + è + e^, where are residuals 
i=l 
from the cointegrating regression. Approximate critical 
values for the ADF statistic at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
-2.84, -3.17, and -3.77, respectively. See Engle and Granger 
(1987). Two asterisks imply the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of non cointegration at the 5% level. CRDW is the 
cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson statistic derived from 
Sagan and Bhargava (1983). Critical values for CRDW at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 0.322, 0.386, and 0.511 when we 
consider a 2-variable case. 
^Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table II.5. (Continued) 
Cointegrating Regression:" 
P,., = o„ + e,cj„ 4- V, 
Models Gc R2 CRDW DF ADF Value^ 
5. Central —0.86 
(0.60) 
20.85 
(1.84) 
0.80 0.35 -1. 88 -2.78 
6. Eastcentral -1.27 
(0.47) 
21.18 
(1.51) 
0.86 0.32 -1. 83 -2 .44 
7. Southwest 0.17 
(0.27) 
14.66 
(1.16) 
0.83 0.48 —2. 21 -2.41 
8. Southcentral -0.13 
(0.21) 
13.66 
(1.05) 
0.84 0. 51 —2 . 47 -1.96 
9. Southeast -0.24 
(0.38) 
15.86 
(1.34) 
0.81 0.52 —2. 31 -2.13 
Acforeaated Model 
10. State -1.10 
(0.48) 
20.53 
(1.69) 
0.82 0.30 -1. 74 -3.22** 
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Table 1.6. The cointegration test for land prices and 
cropshares® 
Cointegrating Regression 
Pt = + 8.dst + V, 
Models Co 6, R2 CRDW DF ADF^ 
Disaaareaated Models 
1. Northwest 2.80 
(1.07): 
9.40 
(3.87) 
0. 14 0.25 -1.52 -1.86 
2. Northcentral 2.25 
(1.39) 
11.10 
(4.64) 
0. 14 0.17 -1.31 -1.84 
3. Northeast 1.73 
(1.08) 
8.82 
(3.95) 
0. 12 0.16 -1.38 -1.89 
4. Westcentral 3.30 
(0.93) 
4.24 
(3.50) 
0. 14 0.14 -1.06 -2.30 
® The null hypothesis is that the series of the 
cointegration residual is 1(1). 
^ ADF is the t-statistic for 0 in the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller regression: 
AVj = + è + e^, where are residuals 
i—1 
from the cointegrating regression. Approximate critical 
values for the ADF statistic at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
-2.84, -3.17, and -3.77, respectively. See Engle and Granger 
(1987). The null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be 
rejected at the 10% level in any of these cases. Notations 
used here are: P^= real land prices per acre, dg^= real 
cropshare rents per acre. CRDW is the cointegrating 
regression Durbin-Watson statistic derived from Sagan and 
Bhargava (1983). Critical values for CRDW at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels are 0.322, 0.386, and 0.511 when we consider a 
2- variable case. 
•^Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.6. (Continued) 
Cointegrating Regression 
Pt = =0 + \ 
Models Co 8, RZ CRDW DF ADpb 
5. Central 3.07 
(1.28) 
7.98 
(4.03) 
0.10 0.14 -1.13 -1.83 
6. Eastcentral 3.39 
(1.27) 
5.49 
(4.00) 
0.05 0.10 -1.09 -2.05 
7. Southwest 2.66 
(0.63) 
3.15 
(2.52) 
0. 04 0.14 -1.02 -2.67 
8. Southcentral 2.01 
(0.48) 
1.75 
(2.17) 
0.12 0.11 -0.94 -2.50 
9. Southeast 1.79 
(0.81) 
7.69 
(2.78) 
0.18 0.19 -1.32 -1.91 
Acrareaated Model 
10. State 2.42 
(1.04) 
7.36 
(3.67) 
0.10 0.14 -1.23 -1.89 
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Table 1.7. Cointegration regressions and tests among 
land prices, cashrents, and cropshares® 
Cointegrating Regression;" 
^t-1 " Gg + 01 dg^ + ©2 dg^., + Vt 
Models Cq 8i *2 R2 CRDW DP ADpc 
Disaaareaated Models 
1. Northwest -1.56 
(0.68)d 
28.16 
(2.47) 
-2.21 
(2.12) 
0. 83 0.53 -2. 33 -2.85* 
2. Northcentral 1.57 
(0.78) 
24.16 
(2.07) 
-0.08 
(2.47) 
0. 84 0. 34 -1. 83 -2 . 37 
3. Northeast -1.98 
(0.71) 
20.54 
(2.04) 
1.39 
(2.28) 
0. 79 0.31 -1. 77 -2.33 
®The null hypothesis is that the series of the 
cointegration residual is 1(1). Notations used are P^: real 
land prices per acre; d^^: real cash rents per acre; d^^: real 
crop share rents per acre. 
^he farmland price reported for year t by the Iowa Land 
Value Survey is a fourth quarter of the year (November of year 
t) price; cashrent is paid at the beginning of the period, 
while cropshare is paid at the end of the period. Thus P^.^, 
dj.j and dg^ . are used to take care of contemporaneous 
measurement for two series. 
^ADF is the t-statistic for 0 in the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller regression: 
AV^ = 0V^.i + è + ©t' where are residuals 
i=l 
from the cointegrating regression. Engle and Yoo (1987) have 
calculated critical values based on the Monte Carlo method. 
Critical values at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are, 
respectively, 3.77, 3.17, and 2.84. CRDW is the cointegrating 
regression Durbin-Watson statistic derived from Sagan and 
Bhargava (1983). Critical values for CRDW at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels are 0.3 08, 0.367, and 0.488 when we consider the 3 
variable case. Two (one) asterisks imply the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of noncointegration at the five (one) percent 
level. 
^Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 1.7. (Continued) 
Cointegrating Regression;" 
Pfi = Co + 8i dot + 02 + V t 
Models Co 8i 6: CRDW DF ADpc 
4. Westcentral 0. 005 
(0.65) 
19.51 
(11.99) 
-2.82 
(1.72) 
0. 76 0.44 -2. 09 -3.01* 
5. Central —0.60 
(0.79) 
21.18 
(1.96) 
-1.14 
(2.27) 
0. 80 0. 38 -1. 96 -2.72 
6. Eastcentral -1.07 
(0.67) 
21.33 
(1.56) 
-0.74 
(1.82) 
0. 86 0.34 -1. 88 -3.09* 
7. Southwest 0.22 
(0.37) 
14.71 
(1.19) 
-0.28 
(1.84) 
0. 83 0.49 -2. 24 -2.41 
8. Southcentral -0.32 
(0.25) 
13.58 
(0.92) 
1.10 
(0.82) 
0. 87 0.37 -1. 64 -2.15 
9. Southeast -0.61 
(0.47) 
15.32 
(1.41) 
1.81 
(1.53) 
0. 82 0.49 -2 . 24 -1.94 
Aaareaated Model 
10. State -0.93 
(0.62) 
20.82 -0.92 
(1.82) (1.96) 
0. 82 0.31 -1. 75 -3.34** 
56 
6. DISCUSSION 
We have mixed results in aggregate and disaggregate 
markets, which seems to provide an interesting anomaly between 
local and global land markets. Assuming that results from the 
disaggregate data are true, consider the following question: 
under what conditions can results from the disaggregate 
markets be inconsistent with the aggregate market? To answer 
the above question and to draw reasonable economic 
interpretations from the mixed empirical evidence, let's set 
up a simple theoretical model for the disaggregate land 
markets. 
Suppose there are two local land markets, i and j. 
Further, suppose there exists no cointegration between 
individual land prices and rents. 
Pit = + "if 
Pjt = "jdjt + Uj,, Au.,=6j, (29) 
where and ej^ are stationary by structure. Rearranging two 
of the equations yields 
Pit+Pjt = (a;+«j) (djt+djj - a,.{dj, + (a./û:j)dj,} + (u,, + u . ^ )  
Thus 
Pt = YDt + M(d,.,,dj.^) + U, (30) 
where P^,D^ are linear combinations of (Pjt^Pjt) and (d,,.,dj^); 
M(d.^,djj) is the linear combination of the levels of rents; 
U^=u-^+Ujj is the sum of residuals, and y=a.+a.. For the system 
to be consistent with the present value model discussed above 
and its cointegration test, we rewrite (30) as follows; 
Pt = YDt + V, = M(d,.,,dj.,) + U, (31) 
If Pj, are the simple averages of the disaggregate land 
prices and rents, then should be stationary if u^^ and Uj^ 
are stationary. But empirical evidence indicates that they do 
not appear to be the simple average of the disaggregate data. 
The arithmetic averages of individual land prices and rents 
have the cointegration relation, but the disaggregate land 
prices and rents do not. Under what conditions can land 
prices and rents be cointegrated at the aggregate level but 
not at the disaggregate level? Land prices and rents are 
cointegrated if are integrated of order zero. There are 
three possible cases for to be stationary: 
(i) M(d;,,d.,)~I(0) and n,~I(0) , 
(ii) M(dj^,djt)~I(l) , Ut~I(0) but Ut-I(O) is dominant 
over M(d,^,d.^)~I(l) 
(iii) M(dj^,dj^) ~I (1) , Uj~I(l) and a linear combination of 
[M(dj,,d.,)~I(l), U,~I(1)]-I(0) . 
Because the components of are not observable, it is 
hard to distinguish which condition actually corresponds to 
the Iowa data. An interesting case would be the first where 
the sum of the disaggregate errors are stationary, even when 
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the errors are themselves nonstationary. A possible 
explanation is that the shocks to local land markets are 
inversely correlated so that the magnitude of is always 
smaller than either or Ug^. 
Suppose there are local shocks such as changes in 
agricultural policy which alter relative probability of the 
districts. Since the total supply of land in the state is 
fixed, a shift in speculative demand toward more profitable 
land will occur. However the speculative demand for land 
elsewhere will decrease. This is because the price of land in 
general depends not only on the properties of the income 
stream but also on the fixed total wealth and the liquidity in 
the market. One implication of this is that an unanticipated 
change in the demand for land in any one market will have 
opposite effects on prices of the other markets. Thus in the 
long run, the relative speculative demand shifts in land will 
sum to zero. This can potentially cause local land market 
shocks to cancel each other in the state land market. 
59 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In Part I, we have studied the validity of the present 
value model of land prices by applying the recent developments 
of nonstationary time series analysis proposed by Engle and 
Granger (1987) to annual Iowa farmland prices and rents over 
the 1950-1986 sample period. Data cover both the aggregate 
market and disaggregate markets. Rents or returns include 
cashrent, cropshare rents, and/or the mixture of two. We set 
up the general equilibrium asset pricing model and derived 
optimization conditions which give the pricing function as a 
solution. Under the maintained assumptions, the general 
pricing function of land price provides a testable 
restriction; a cointegration relationship between land prices 
and rents. We found mixed results: At the aggregate level, 
there exists one cointegration between land prices and 
cashrents but not for cropshare rent and land prices. When 
all of the contracts associated with land leasing are 
considered, there is stronger evidence of a cointegration 
relationship among land prices, cropshare rents, and cashrents 
in the aggregate level. However, there is less evidence 
supporting cointegration between land prices and rents in the 
disaggregated local farmland markets. 
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The results from the aggregate level imply that a 
speculative component such as a rational bubble does not 
appear in the aggregate farmland market. However, results of 
no cointegration relationships from the most of the local 
markets do not necessarily imply the existence of a rational 
speculative component in local farmland prices. 
Possible explanations of these features of the data 
including both aggregate market and disaggregate markets are 
discussed in the previous section. Micro bubbles or fads 
representing local speculation in the disaggregate markets are 
likely to be washed out in the aggregate market. It is, 
however, difficult to conclude that these arguments are the 
convincing explanations for the mixed results in the absence 
of the formal models which describe the washing out of local 
bubbles. These would be the future research agenda. 
Hamilton and Whiteman (1985) and Diba and Grossman (1988) 
have advocated a cointegration test to distinguish the 
existence of rational bubbles from unobservable market 
fundamentals. The test is not very sensitive to possible 
misspecification of market fundamentals in the present value 
formulation. However, recent research on stock markets has 
questioned whether cointegration tests can distinguish between 
the efficient markets hypothesis and the mean reversion or 
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fads model^'. These models attempt to reflect recent evidence 
of predictable variation in stock market returns^°. The 
efficient markets hypothesis argues that future stock price 
movement should not be forecastable, while the model of mean 
reversion (i.e., fads) can explain predictable excess returns 
over the mean. 
The model of mean reversion suggests that the movement of 
asset price has two components, a permanent (nonstationary or 
random walk) part and a transitory (or stationary) part. Fads 
(the transitory component) cause asset prices to overreact to 
news and subsequently to revert partially to their previous 
levels because the transitory component will dominate as the 
horizon expands while the random walk part will dominate in a 
short period. 
Since the cointegration test is based on the existence of 
an exactly one unit root in the residuals from the 
cointegration regression, the power of the cointegration tests 
may be too low to distinguish between the efficient markets 
^'The fads model was suggested by Shiller (1984) and 
Summers (1986). 
^°Fama and French (1988) estimated that such a mean 
reverting component of stock prices may account for up to 45 
percent of the variances of 3-5 years returns. Campbell and 
Shiller (1988) found predictable movements in excess returns 
even for a ten year holding period. Poterba and Summers 
(1987) estimated positive autocorrelation in returns over 
short horizons and negative autocorrelation over longer 
horizons. 
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hypothesis and the mean reversion (i.e. fads). Thus mixed 
evidence in regard to the implication of the model could 
reflect the low power of the cointegration tests. 
Another possibility is that there may be measurement 
errors invalidating the tests. That is, our measures of real 
cashrent and cropshare may not be the appropriate measures of 
the true return to land ownership. The rental rates measure 
returns to crop land, where the land price reflects all 
productive land uses, especially livestock production and real 
estate development, etc. If the nature of the productive uses 
have changed over time, the nature of the equilibrium 
relationships between rents and land prices may also change. 
It is not clear how this measurement error would affect the 
results of the test, or if in fact the measurement error is a 
serious problem. 
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PART II. THE SPATIAL LAND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is extensive literature which examines the 
efficiency of financial markets. However little research has 
examined the efficiency of the real estate markets (Case and 
R. Shiller (1989)). It is commonly asserted that such markets 
may be inefficient because of transaction costs, carrying 
costs, and tax considerations. In a recent empirical study 
using data on residential property values of existing houses 
from 57 metropolitan areas, Guntermann and Smith (1987) 
concluded that the real estate market is efficient in the weak 
form sense once transaction costs are considered^. Case and 
Shiller (1989) tested the random-walk theory for housing 
prices as an efficiency test for single-family homes. They 
concluded that there is inertia in housing prices, increases 
in prices over any year tending to be followed by increases in 
the subsequent year. They pointed out that although there is 
little hope of proving definitely that the housing market is 
not efficient, the market for single-family homes does not 
^Consideration of the financial and nonfinancial costs 
associated with real estate transactions indicates that a 
trading strategy would not be profitable. These costs 
exceeded the maximum expected appreciation following an 
affordability trading strategy (Guntermann and Smith (1987, p. 
42)). 
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appear to be efficient. 
The spatial form of the efficient market hypothesis 
implies that there exists a long run relationship between land 
prices. The recent development in nonstationary time series 
analysis, involving the concept of cointegration, provides a 
new method for testing the efficient market hypothesis. 
The next section discusses the spatial form of the market 
efficiency hypothesis applied to comovements of farmland 
prices. Section 3 presents a definition and statistical tests 
of cointegration, its implications for asset market 
efficiency, and in particular, an economic interpretation of 
the restricted multivariate model under the efficient markets 
hypothesis. Section 4 presents the empirical tests of 
farmland market efficiency and estimation of the multivariate 
model with the cointegration restriction. Section 5 provides 
brief concluding remarks. 
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2. SPATIAL MARKETS EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS: 
COMOVEMENTS OF ASSET PRICES IN THE EFFICIENT MARKETS MODEL 
The efficient-markets model is 
P„ = E, P,,*, (1) 
where P.^ is the price of a unit of asset i and is the 
value of asset i which is represented by the present value at 
time t of dividends starting with time t and into the future. 
denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on all 
publicly available information at time t. 
In the context of stock markets, it is claimed that under 
the efficient-markets model (1), asset prices i and j at time 
t, P{^ and Pj;, can be perfectly correlated with each other even 
if Pj^* and are perfectly uncorrelated with each other^^. 
Figure l shows land prices for representative districts over 
years 1950-1988. It seems there are common trends in land 
prices across different geographic areas. Apart from 
intuitively just comparing plots, it is interesting to ask 
whether real asset prices covary in the theoretical framework. 
Under the efficient markets model, land prices can be strongly 
correlated with each other since the farmland in Iowa is 
^^Shiller (1989) studied the comovements in real stock 
prices between the U.K. and the U.S. based on present value 
relations of each country. 
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relatively homogeneous in terms of land use and is also 
subject to common weather, policy shocks, and price shocks. 
It is natural to argue that each land price satisfies (1) and 
that two land prices have the long run relationship; 
Pit = Co + a Pjt + Vit (2) 
where P.^, Pj^ are farmland prices from regions i and j at time 
t. v^t is a residual. Cq reflects the constant real price 
differential due to difference in the quality of land in 
regions i and j. This long-run relationship maintains the 
present value relation of each asset price, which can be 
represented by the discounted present value of the stream of 
dividends from farmland. 
The general equilibrium asset pricing theory of Lucas 
derives Euler equations which asset prices must satisfy to be 
an equilibrium solution. The equilibrium condition is of the 
form: 
= B Et U"(Ct,,)/U'(Ct) [Pmt+i + (3) 
where P^t is the asset price in region m at time t and d^t is 
the dividends from holding farmland in region m at time t. 
Substituting Pj^ and Pjt into a simple relation between Pjt 
and Pjt, P,t = c + aPjt provides further implications of 
equation (2) in the context of the present value model: 
^it+i) — c + aKt(Pjt+i + <3jt+i) , 
where =  R  U' (Ct+^) /u' (Ct) , assuming certainty equivalence. 
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Rearranging, 
(^it+1 ^it+1 ) ~ C/Kf ^jt+1 ) 
^it+1 ~ (^/^t ~ *^11+1J "*" ^^jt+1 
Assuming risk neutrality, = 6, and we can write 
Pit+1 = + GPjt+1 
where = S + - d,.^+^, Cg = c/R 
Thus Pj^ = C; + aPjj 
= Co + OP., if d,^ = adj., 
Therefore the spatial market efficiency hypothesis (MEH) can 
be tested to see whether there exists a long run relationship 
between real asset prices as in equation (2). If two asset 
prices represent prices from the efficient markets model, the 
prices should have a common stochastic trend which implies a 
long run equilibrium between the prices. In the context of 
the time series analysis, this long-run relationship can be 
described as the cointegration relationship between these 
asset prices if each asset price has a unit root. Under the 
efficient markets model (1), two asset prices share a 
stochastic common trend if there exists a cointegration 
relationship. This paper is concerned with the properties of 
the residuals obtained from the estimates of the weak version 
of the spatial MEH. For if MEH of the linear form is to have 
any meaning as an equilibrium concept, the residuals in (2) 
must follow a stationary mean zero process. Only then can two 
real asset prices share a common trend or equilibrium in the 
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long run. Alternatively, if nonstationarity were found in the 
residual series, then the estimated equilibrium could be 
misleading and irrelevant as the same variables could drift 
apart without bound. 
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3. COINTEGRATION AND TESTING LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA 
3.1. Issue Of cointegration 
The theory underlying cointegration developed by Granger 
and his associates (see, e.g., Granger and Weiss, 1983; 
Granger, 1986; Engle and Granger, 1987, etc.) is a relatively 
new statistical tool in time series analysis. The issue of 
cointegration is briefly summarized here before performing it 
for the spatial MEH. 
Economic hypotheses usually posit equilibrium 
relationships between groups of variables. The equilibrium 
relationships are assumed to be valid in the long-run, with 
deviations from the equilibrium in the short-run recognized as 
a distinct possibility. Cointegration theory is designed to 
address itself to the testing and specification problems 
associated with such equilibrium relationships. 
Cointegration is a property possessed by some 
nonstationary time series data. In general, two variables are 
said to be cointegrated when a linear combination of the two 
is stationary, even though each variable is nonstationary as 
is the case with many economic variables which typically trend 
through time. In statistical terminology, series X^, and 
are said to be integrated of order d if they have stationary. 
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invertible, non-deterministic ARIMA representations after 
differencing d times. Notationally, this is represented as 
1(d). If a linear combination of and is integrated 
of order b, 1(b), and b < d, then and are known to be 
^cointegrated of order (d,d-b)', denoted as CI(d,d-b)^^. In a 
special case where X^ and Y^ are 1(1), they will be 
cointegrated of order (1,1) if a linear combination of X^ and 
Y^ is stationary, i.e., 1(0). More precisely, if X^ - aY^ = 
is stationary, X^ and Y^ are said to be cointegrated of order 
(1,1) with a known as the vector of cointegrating. parameters. 
Both X^ and Y^, being 1(1), have dominant long-run components. 
But is 1(0) and hence is free of any long-run components. 
The relationship 
X, = aY, (5) 
(with or without an additional constant on the right-hand 
side) may regarded as the long-run equilibrium for the system. 
When a cointegration relationship exists, the system cannot 
drift too far from the equilibrium in equation (5) in the 
long-run^\ 
3.2. Tests for cointegration 
A number of tests have been proposed in the literature to 
^^see Engle and Granger (1987) . 
^'•See, e.g., Granger (1986). 
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determine if nonstationary economic time series of interest 
are cointegrated. Granger and Engle (1987) propose a range of 
possible tests which may be used for cointegration tests. 
These tests are related to the residual based cointegration 
tests. Here I will discuss the residual based cointegration 
tests. In a first-order system, two procedures were found to 
be best: a Durbin-Wastson (DW) test and a Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
test. In higher-order systems, the Dickey-Fuller test is 
generalized to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) 
following Engle and Granger (1987). Engle and Granger (1987) 
investigated tests for the null hypothesis that a pair of time 
series which are each 1(1) are not cointegrated against the 
alternative hypothesis that time series are cointegrated. 
Engle and Yoo (1987) have extended the procedures of Engle and 
Granger (1987) by allowing different sample sizes and 
different numbers of variables. 
For all the tests, the first step is to estimate the 
cointegrating or equilibrium regression 
X, = Co + aY, + V, (6) 
Vj is the OLS residual from the cointegration regression. 
Stock (1984) has demonstrated that when and are 
cointegrated, OLS estimates of a are consistent and highly 
efficient. Given OLS estimates of the residual series V^, 
tests of cointegration proceed by setting up the null 
hypothesis that X^ and Y^ are not cointegrated. Cointegration 
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in the special case requires the absence of unit roots in the 
residual series, V^, of the cointegrating regression. This 
section concentrates on three tests: the Sargan-Bhargava 
(1983) DW test, the Dickey-Fuller test, and the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of residuals from the cointegrating 
regression. Now suppose follows an AR(1) process so that 
V, = pV,.^ + e, (7) 
Then cointegration would imply that p <1. This suggests 
testing the null hypothesis that p > 1. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis would then accept that the error process has a unit 
root. The cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test 
statistic, d*, is the DW statistic from regressions of 
Equation 5. Critical values for d* have been furnished by 
Engle and Granger (1987), who also note various limitations of 
this test. However, since it is so easy to compute, d* can be 
used for a quick approximate result. The null corresponds to 
the DW statistic being zero. If the estimated CRDW is above 
the critical value, the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
may be rejected. The Dickey-Fuller (DF) test is based on the 
tests for unit roots initially formulated by Fuller (1976) and 
later extended by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981). Consider 
the following regression 
AV, = + e, (8) 
Under the null that p = 1, 0=0, if p<l, 0<1 we perform a t-
test to test whether 0 is significantly less than zero. The 
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t-statistic on 0 is the DF statistic. Since this statistic 
does not have a standard normal distribution, we use the 
critical values for statistics given in Fuller (1976, pp. 371-
373). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test proceeds 
essentially as the DF test but with Equation 7 modified to 
AV, = 0V,., + Eb;AV,.. + e, (9) 
The t-test is used to test whether 0 is significantly less 
than zero. The simulation results of Engle and Granger 
(1987), reinforced by those of Engle and Yoo (1987), indicate 
that the ADF test is more powerful than the other tests. This 
feature, combined with its computational simplicity, 
constitutes a strong argument in favor of the use of the ADF 
in empirical work. 
3.3. Extent of Violation in Cointegration Relation 
The existence of a long run relationship between real 
asset prices from different areas is tested based on equation 
(2). If the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected, 
results are supportive of the spatial EMH. In cases where the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted, it is 
necessary to ask ourselves how great the violation of 
cointegration is. Employing a decomposition theorem for 
nonstationary processes, we can measure the extent of the 
violation of cointegration as the proportion of the 
nonstationary residual series which is attributable to the 
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nonstationary component. 
Let Cq + aPjt be an estimation of what should be, where 
asset markets are perfectly competitive. Suppose cases where 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted so that 
the residual series follow a nonstationary process. Suppose 
the residual series obtained from the estimation of the 
cointegration regression is decomposed into two components, 
V; = S; + n^ (10) 
where is the residual series from the cointegration 
regression; Sj is a nonstationary component which can be 
described by a random walk process with drift; and n^ is a 
stationary component which can be described by a simple iid 
process, s^ and n^ are uncorrelated with each other. Then 
+ n^ is the value of Pj^ that is compatible with the spatial 
MEH. By separating the stationary component from the residual 
series, we can derive a measurement which is consistent with 
EMH. 
1 - V(sJ/V(P,,) (11) 
where V(s^) is the variance of the nonstationary component of 
Vç and V(Pj^) is the variance of asset prices Pj^. This 
measures the proportion of the variance in asset price, P,,., 
that is consistent with EMH. If the numerical value of this 
statistic is large, for example, 0.99, then this indicates 
that only 1% of variance of asset price is attributable to the 
nonstationary component of a residual. This result implies 
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that the violation of cointegration may be economically 
negligible due to information costs or transaction costs. 
3.4. The Restricted Multivariate Autoregressive Model 
The subsection above presented an argument that land 
prices from efficient markets are cointegrated. The 
implication is that there should exist an error correction 
representation between those variables in each pair of land 
prices. This model, in fact, is a multivariate autoregressive 
model with one root restricted to be one. One of the main 
attractions of the concept of cointegration is that it 
provides a framework for modelling both the long-run 
equilibrium, information about which is often given by 
economic theory, and the short-run deviations from equilibrium 
about which little theoretical information exists. 
The Granger representation theorem states that if a set 
of variables are cointegrated, then there exists a valid 
error-correction representation of the data. More generally, 
if Xj, is an Nxi vector such that follows integrated 
processes of an order of one and is the cointegrating vector 
then the following general model may be derived: 
A(L)(1-L)X, = - Y Z;.., + d(L) (12) 
where = a'X^, A(L) is a finite polynomial with A(0) = and 
d(L) is a finite order lag polynomial. 
For the bivariate system under consideration, a typical 
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error-correction model is observationally equivalent to the 
bivariate aut©regressive model with one root restricted to be 
one. This model relates the change in one variable to past 
levels of variables as well as past changes in both variables. 
The important implication of this model is that multivariate 
autoregressive representation of dynamics involving just 
differenced terms may have missed a potentially important 
variable if they have left out adjustment to past equilibrium 
errors. 
Since I assume that any pair of farmland prices under the 
efficient markets model, and are cointegrated, there 
must exist an error correction representation. Thus farmland 
prices under the efficient markets model can be described by 
the bivariate autoregressive model as follows; 
>
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subject to the restrictions, 
= CH21 and H,2 = CH22. . . (14) 
Here the level terms are related with the error correction 
terms in the error correction model so that constant ratio '(' 
is, in fact, equivalent to the cointegration vector. This 
error correction term can be expressed in terms of 
coefficients of the full model, + (H,3/^11)Pjt-i> and 
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S2t.i=H2i{P,t-i + ("22/^21 )Pjt-i} Where = 0. Since must 
occur in at least one of the equations, knowledge of must 
improve the forecastability of at least one of or 
both. In other words, this restricted model makes it possible 
to determine how, if at all, farmland prices adjust to 
eliminate deviations from equilibrium between two land 
markets. The model has the advantage of separating the long-
run (coefficients on P^ and PjJ and the short-run 
(coefficients on AP.^ and APj^) responses, each of which has an 
associated economic interpretation. The terms, S.^., and 
are called the ^spread' and represent the long-run adjustments 
to past disequilibrium. It is important to note that changes 
in Pj^ and Pj^ depend not only on the first difference of lagged 
Pj^ and Pj^, but also on the levels of lagged P,^ and Pj^. Thus, 
the changes in P^^ and Pj^ are due to the immediate, short run 
effect from the changes in P,^ and Pj^ and to the last period's 
spread or error based on the long-run equilibrium. If the 
prices are cointegrated, then one price Granger causes the 
other, i.e., one price could be used to forecast the other 
price. Thus, the existence of a cointegration relation 
between two asset prices indicates that those markets are 
efficient in the spatial sense, because agents who make 
economic decisions on the basis of observed prices will 
exploit the information in one market to predict the prices in 
the other market. 
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3.5. The Reduced Model and Cointegration Tests 
The full model (13) can be reparameterized to get a 
restricted model which has three parameters to be estimated in 
the bivariate system. That is, there exists some multiplier 
vector, C'/ which makes the limiting distribution of the 
errors in the system normal so that C'H = 0, i.e., (1, = 
(0,0) where H is the 2x2 coefficient matrix for (P.^_^,Pj^_^) ^ in 
the full model. The restricted model provides a useful test 
for the restriction that (l,f^)H = (0,0). This test is 
equivalent to the test of the existence of one unit root. 
Following Theorem 8.7.4 in Fuller (1976), the restricted model 
in the bivariate case can be expressed as follows: 
APjt = + C + e^^ (15) 
APjt = HgQ + + Hgg Pjt-1 ^24'^^jt-l ®2t 
Under the null hypothesis, Pj^.^ and Pj^., are instrumental 
variables which are not correlated with e,^, and do not appear 
in the first equation. The test for the existence of one unit 
root is the same as the test of the restriction that C'H = 0 
in the restricted model. The limiting distribution of the 
test statistic is established by theorem 8.7.4 in Fuller 
(1990). The limit of {(£-l)(n-k)} approaches as n 
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approaches infinity, where n is the number of observations and 
k is the number of exogenous variables. i is the smallest 
root of I = 0, where 5*^  ^ is the residual sum of 
squares for the full model, (13) and is the estimate of 
of the restricted model, (15) . has the distribution of 
Table 8.5.2 in Fuller (1976). If there exists one unit root 
in the bivariate system, it implies that there exists at most 
one cointegration vector^®. The existence of two unit roots 
is also equivalent to a restriction on coefficients, H=0. 
This restriction can be used to distinguish at most one 
cointegration, i.e., the rank of H: r= 1 or 0. If there are 
two unit roots in the bivariate system, the rank of H = r = m-
d =0, which implies that there exists no cointegation. 
^®For an m-dimensional process {Y^}, = C where 
Wj = Yj, - Yj..^ , a test for the number of cointegrations can be 
expressed by the null hypothesis Hg : rank(C)= m-d, where 
d=the number of unit roots. Thus, a test for the reduced rank 
structure for C which estimates r=m-d= the number of 
independent rows in C is equivalent to the tests for 
restriction of d unit roots. See Johansen (1988). 
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4. SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES 
Farmland prices from nine districts in Iowa were chosen 
to undertake the study of the spatial form of the land market 
efficiency hypothesis. The districts are designated as 
northwest, northcentral, northeast, westcentral, central, 
eastcentral, southwest, southcentral, and southeast districts. 
Corn and soybeans are the major crops grown in these areas. 
They fully encompass all of Iowa. 
Each nominal land price series was transformed into real 
terms by dividing the nominal price by the Consumer Price 
Index. The annual land price data cover the sample period 
1950 to 1988. They were collected by the ISU Extension 
Service. Pairwise tests for cointegration were based on these 
district-level prices. Tests for the presence of one unit 
root and two unit roots were performed using the restricted 
two-dimensional autoregressive model. 
A necessary condition for two series to be cointegrated 
is that they are integrated of the same order. All the series 
analyzed showed upward and downward (mean shifting) trends, 
with wide fluctuations for all districts. Standard unit root 
tests (Dickey and Fuller) were performed on all the series to 
test whether the series were integrated of order 1. The 
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results are presented in Table 1, Part I. We cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of one unit root in the series of the land 
prices at the district level. These test results are 
consistent with the presence of a unit root in each series and 
confirm that land price series are nonstationary in levels. 
Given that land price series are all 1(1) processes we 
then proceeded to test for cointegration. OLS estimates for 
the cointegrating regression over pairs of districts are 
reported in Tables II.1 and II.2. Even though Stock (1987) 
showed that OLS estimates of the cointegrating vector will be 
consistent in the case of cointegration, it should be noted 
that, as Banergee et al. (1986) pointed out, the bias in 
smaller sample sizes may be guite substantial unless the is 
reasonably large (that is, >0.95). A high appears to be 
fully consistent with the assertion that the variables are 
themselves 1(1) but cointegrated. Given that each land price 
Pjj and Pjj is nonstationary, deviations from eguilibrium value 
at each time t must be stationary if in the long-run P.j=Cq+û:Pj^ 
holds under the efficient markets model. If the residual 
series follow 1(0), then Pj^ and Pj^ are cointegrated and the 
long-run equilibrium relationship holds, implying spatial 
market efficiency. 
Thirty-six different cointegrating bivariate systems were 
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estimated in both directions^^, testing the null hypothesis of 
non-cointegration against the alternative of cointegration. 
In eighteen of the thirty-six pairs, the null hypothesis of 
non-cointegration can be rejected at the 10% level in favor of 
the alternative of cointegration. The theoretical 
cointegration relationship is more likely to hold in markets 
that are in close proximity to each other. It is useful to 
distinguish the results of the test across adjacent versus 
distinct markets. Grouping land markets into adjacent and 
distinct market is baesd on the soil map published by ISU 
cooperative extention service, PM-1268. My results reveal 
that in twelve cases of twenty pairs of adjacent markets, the 
null hypothesis is rejected, while six of sixteen pairs of 
distinct markets rejected the null. Looking at the results 
from adjacent markets, it is clear there is strong support for 
cointegration in Table II.1. To check the extent of the 
deviation from cointegration in the seven cases out of twenty 
pairs in the adjacent markets, I measure the proportion of the 
variance in the asset prices, that is consistent with EMH. 
The results are presented in Table II.3. All the values in 
Table II.3 are close to 0.98"0.99. This indicates that 
approximately 1% of the variance of asset price is 
^^Since the results are not sensitive to the direction of 
cointegration, result from the estimation in one direction is 
reported here. 
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attributable to the nonstationarity of residual series. The 
implication of this result is that violation of cointegration 
is small. 
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Table II.1. The cointegration test for land prices 
over adjacent markets® 
Cointegration Regression; Unit Root Test for Residuals 
Pit = Co + " Pjt + V; II <
3 
*v,.l + ? + e, 
1=1 
P~^ C^ Ô DW ADF R? 
Adjacent Markets 
1 NC NE 0.148 1.305 0.283 -2.903 * 0.97 
2 NC EC -0.776 1.226 0.364 -2.468 0.97 
3 NC NW -0.564 1.138 1.068 -3.247 ** 0.99 
4 WC NW 0.313 0.770 0.642 -2.334 0.99 
5 WC NC 0.724 0.671 0.573 -2.949 * 0.98 
6 C NW 0.049 1.034 0.974 -2.782 0.98 
7 C NC 0.524 0.911 0.657 -1.005 0.99 
8 C NE 0.683 1.183 0.240 -0.990 0.96 
9 C WC -0.399 1.344 0.733 -3.523 ** 0.98 
10 SC EC -0.066 0.480 0.560 -1.891 0.96 
11 EC NC 0.739 0.796 0.360 -3.814 *** 0.97 
12 EC NE 0.765 1.062 0.965 -3.517 ** 0.99 
13 EC C 0.316 0.867 0.281 -3.010 ** 0.96 
14 SW WC 0.215 0.726 0.643 -2.614 0.98 
15 SW C 0.460 0.535 0.675 -3.014 ** 0.97 
16 SC WC -0.160 0.576 1.001 -2.990 * 0.96 
17 SC c 0.021 0.427 0.952 -2.902 * 0.96 
18 SC SW -0.328 0.793 1.888 —4.604 *** 0.98 
19 SE c 0.194 0.679 1.499 -2.994 * 0.99 
20 SE EC 0.099 0.753 0.319 -2.414 0.94 
®The null hypothesis is that the series of cointegration 
residual is 1(1). 
Statistics above are Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics 
which are t statistics of the coefficient, 0. Approximate 
critical values for the ADF statistic at the 1,5 and 10 
percent levels are, respectively, -3.77, -3.17, and -2.84 
(Engle and Granger (1987)). Three (two, one) asterisks imply 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of non cointegration at 
the one (five, ten) percent levels. See Table II.4 for 
notations. 
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Table II.2. The cointegration test for land prices 
over distinct markets® 
Cointegration Regression; Unit Root Test for Residuals 
Pit = C(J + a Pj^ + V; AVt = m., + ? , + e, 
1 = 1 
Pjç Cq a DW ADpb 
Distinct Markets 
21 SW NW 0.470 0.556 0.734 -2.186 0.97 
22 SW NC 0.765 0.485 0.605 -2.592 0.96 
23 SW NE 0.811 0.639 0.410 -0.962 0.96 
24 WC NE 0.832 0.874 0.239 -2.404 0.95 
25 NE NW -0.433 0.852 0.352 -2.824 * 0.97 
26 EC WC -0.012 1.163 0.293 -2.996 * 0.95 
27 SW EC 0.339 0.603 0.408 -1.876 0.96 
28 SC NW 0.052 0.441 1.026 -3.001 * 0.S6 
29 SC NC 0.272 0.386 0.839 -2.924 * 0.97 
30 SC NE 0.308 0.509 0.508 -1.334 0.96 
31 EC NW 0.286 0.906 0.603 -2.972 * 0.96 
32 SE NW 0.237 0.700 0.844 -2.917 * 0.97 
33 SE NC 0.567 0.617 0.746 -1.836 0.98 
34 SE NE 0.674 0.799 0.289 -1.907 0.96 
35 SE WC -0.061 0.908 0.691 -2.535 0.97 
36 SE SW -0.250 1.228 0.722 -2.716 0.96 
®The null hypothesis is that the series of cointegration 
residual is 1(1). 
''ADF Statistics above are Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
statistic which is t statistics of the coefficient, 0. 
Ap p r o x i m a t e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  A D F  s t a t i s t i c  a t  t h e  1 , 5  
and 10 percent levels are, respectively, -3.77, -3.17 and 
-2.84 (Engle and Granger (1987)). Three (two, one) asterisks 
imply the rejection of the null hypothesis of non 
cointegration at the one (five, ten) percent levels. See 
Table II.4 for notations. 
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Table II.3. The test for extent of cointegration violations 
over adjacent markets® 
Districts ADF EXTENT RATIO 
2. NC EC -2.468 0.9927010 
4. WC NW -2.334 0.9927011 
6. C NW -1.753 0.9898708 
7. C NC -1.005 0.9960667 
8. C NE -0.990 0.9670243 
14. SW WC -2.614 0.9861653 
to
 
o
 
SE EC -2.414 0.9901606 
*Ratio is calculated by a measure; 1 - V(s^) /V(P(^) where 
V(s^) is the variance of the nonstationary component of and 
V(Pj^) is the variance of the asset price This measures 
the proportion of the variance in asset price, P that is 
consistent with EMH. Notations used in this chapter are the 
following: NW = Northwest district, NC = Northcentral 
district, NE = Northeast district, WC = Westcentral district, 
C = Central district, EC = Eastcentral district, SW = 
Southwest district, SC = Southcentral district, and SE = 
Southeast district-
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To confirm the results from the residual based 
cointegration tests, I also performed tests for one unit root 
and two unit roots by testing the restriction that C'H = 0 in 
the bivariate model. I performed the overidentification tests 
for one unit root over both 'adjacent' and 'distinct' markets 
based on the restricted bivariate model (15). Results are 
reported in Tables II.4 and II.5. The null hypothesis of a 
single unit root was accepted at the 10% significance level 
for all the thirty-six pairwise relations. This implies that 
all the tested bivariate relationships have at most one 
cointegration. To distinguish the number of cointegrations 
between one cointegration (rank(H)=l) and no cointegration 
(rank(H)=0), we performed the test for the restriction, H=0, 
which is equivalent to the test for two unit roots. This test 
implies a test for no cointegration because rank(H)=r=m-d, 
where m=dimensions and d=number of unit roots. Evidence for 
spatial market efficiency based on the restriction tests are 
weaker than the residual based cointegration tests. We 
rejected the null hypothesis of two unit roots (no 
cointegration) at the 10% significance level when the test 
statistic is greater than 3.95. Twenty out of thirty-six have 
at most one unit root, implying that there exits just one 
cointegration relation. Eleven of twenty pairs from adjacent 
markets supported the long run relationship, while nine out of 
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sixteen pairs from distinct markets supported the spatial MEH. 
See Tables II.6 and II.7. Slightly different results from the 
different geographical distances seem to reflect the soil 
quality and productivity of farm land. Overall, these results 
imply that for many cases, levels of land prices are 
nonstationary but cointegrated. These are quite favorable to 
the market efficiency hypothesis in the spatial sense. 
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Table II.4. The overidentification test for one unit root in 
the bivariate system over adjacent markets* 
Models 
1 NC NE 3.840 
2 NC EC 4.404 
3 NC NW 4.580 
4 WC NW 4.047 
5 WC NC 4.079 
6 C NW 3.145 
7 C NC 3.836 
8 C NE 4.468 
9 C WC 3.218 
10 EC NW 3.341 
11 EC NC 4.404 
12 EC NE 3.707 
13 EC C 4.826 
14 SW WC 4.315 
15 SW C 4.177 
16 SC WC 2.143 
17 SC C 3.107 
18 SC SW 3.647 
19 SE c 3.743 
20 SE EC 6.063 
= {(£-1) (n-k) }, where n is the number of 
observations, k is the number of exogenous variables, and £ is 
the root of the determinant of the equation associated with 
the limited information maximum likelihood estimation of the 
reduced model, (15). is given by Fuller (1976). Critical 
values at the 10% and 5% significance levels are, 
respectively, 6.76 and 8.55. I accepted the null hypothesis 
of a single unit root at the 10% significance level when is 
less than T^^p,p=6.76. 
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Table II.5. The overidentification test for one unit root 
in the bivariate system over distinct markets® 
Models 
21 sw NW 3.225 
22 SW NC 4.781 
23 SW NE 3.833 
24 WC NE 3.405 
25 NE NW 3.437 
26 EC WC 3.140 
27 SW EC 3.267 
28 SC NW 1.931 
29 SC NC 0.295 
30 SC NE 3.803 
31 SC EC 4. 628 
32 SE NW 4.023 
33 SE NC 3.184 
34 SE NE 5.224 
35 SE WC 3.740 
36 SE SW 5.113 
= {(£-1) (n-k) }, where n is the number of 
observations, k is the number of exogenous variables, and £ is 
the root of the determinant of the equation associated with 
the limited information maximum likelihood estimation of (15) . 
is given by Fuller (1976). See Table II.3 for notations. 
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Table II.6. The two unit roots test in the bivariate system 
over adjacent markets® 
Models F 
1 NC NE 10.7617 
2 NC EC 10.0389 
3 NC NW 4.4833 
4 WC NW 3.4771 
5 WC NC 3.2665 
6 C NW 3.4616 
7 C NC 1.9292 
8 C NE 6.6423 
9 C WC 3.7205 
10 EC NW 5.6053 
11 EC NC 10.0389 
12 EC NE 3.2190 
13 EC C 9.4804 
14 SW WC 2.6840 
15 SW C 4.7698 
16 SC WC 2.9993 
17 SC C 3.4674 
18 SC SW 8.0005 
19 SE C 9.3223 
20 SE EC 12.4573 
®The null hypothesis: the vector H=0 in 
(13)). Reinsel and Ahn (1989) provide the 10% point to this 
test as 3.95. See Table II.3 for notations. 
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Table II.7. The two rnit roots test in the bivariate system 
over distinct markets® 
Models F 
21 SW NW 1.8544 
22 SW NC 3.2994 
23 SW NE 3.2362 
24 WC NE 7.6662 
25 NE NW 8.2955 
26 EC WC 5.0274 
27 SW EC 3.3600 
28 SC NW 3.3507 
29 SC NC 2.6455 
30 SC NE 3.3856 
31 SC EC 5.0108 
32 SE NW 6.8109 
33 SE NC 5.3437 
34 SE NE 8.5305 
35 SE WC 5.3592 
36 SE SW 5.9559 
® The null hypothesis: the vector H=0 in 
(13)). Reinsel and Ahn (1989) provide the 10% point to this 
test as 3.95. See Table II.3 for notations. 
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Table II.8. Nonlinear Estimates of coefficients on Bivariate 
Autoregressive Model with one unit root 
APit «10 «11 «12 Pit-1 «13 «14 A^it-I ®1t 
m  f + 
«20 «21 «22 Pjt-I _«23 «24 ^Pjt-1 -®2t_ 
^ — MM M 
subject to the nonlinear restrictions, 
= CHji and 
Coefficients of Models 
r^ "T 
[«lol [«11 «12I ["«13 «14I c 
L«2OJ L«21 "d L«23 H24J 
1. NO NE -0.11 
-0.14 
0.76 
-1.10 
0.92 
-1.20 
1.14 
0.36 
-1.22 
-0.40 
0.83 
2. NO EC 1.07 
1.13 
1.31 
-1.61 
1.41 
-1.73 
0.91 
0.27 
-1.15 
-0.45 
0.93 
3. NO NW 0.30 
0.61 
0.39 
0.60 
-0.61 
-0.75 
0.21 
-0.29 
0.31 
0.80 
0.63 
10. EC NW 0.08 
0.04 
-0.75 
0.69 
-0.23 
0.21 
-0.32 
-0.47 
0.49 
0.75 
3 .29 
11. EC NC 1.13 
1.07 
-1.72 
1.40 
-1.61 
1.31 
—0.45 
-1.15 
0.27 
0.91 
1.07 
13. EC C -0.23 
-0.48 
1.88 
-1.30 
3.92 
-2.71 
-0.87 
-1.37 
0.78 
1.16 
0.48 
15. SW C 0.29 
0.17 
-0.63 
0.32 
-0.33 
0.17 
0.69 
0.65 
-0.09 
0.16 
1.90 
18. SC SW -0.02 
0.15 
—0.08 
0.04 
1.16 
-0.53 
0.21 
0.15 
0.17 
0. 56 
-0.07 
19. SE C -0.23 
-0.48 
1.88 
-1.30 
3.92 
-2.71 
-0.87 
-1.37 
0.78 
1. 16 
0.48 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Part II has investigated the spatial market efficiency of 
farmland. Because the spatial efficient markets hypothesis 
implies a long run equilibrium between asset prices under the 
present value assumption, one test method was used in which 
the properties of nonstationary land prices were detected. 
The usual residual based cointegration test was used to test 
the spatial MEH. Also since it is possible to test the 
underlying long run relationship under the null hypothesis by 
using a structural model, another test method was utilized in 
which restrictions were imposed on the coefficients of the 
full model to get the restricted model. The test for 
restrictions of the regressions were used to set up the 
spatial MEH, in which at most one cointegration (one long run 
relationship) was tested against other alternatives. These 
methods were applied to district level data on Iowa farmland 
prices from 1950 to 1988. Empirical support for the spatial 
MEH satisfied the requirement of the existence of a long run 
equilibrium relationship between land prices. Testable 
implications of the long run relationship were more strongly 
supported across adjacent markets than across distinct 
markets. The results from the bivariate tests imply that for 
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most cases, levels of land prices across adjacent markets have 
a long run equilibrium relationship. These seem to be quite 
favorable to the market efficiency in the spatial sense. 
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PART III. RETURN AND RISK IN LAND MARKETS: 
CROPSHARE CONTRACTS VS CASERENT CONTRACTS 
98 
1, INTRODUCTION 
Models in which expected returns are linear in risk have 
long been important in finance and economics. Systematic risk 
associated with holding a given asset is measured by a 
parameter (referred to as the beta coefficient) which 
indicates how the return on a given asset varies with respect 
to a marketwide return. A comparison of betas across 
different assets may be used by investors to evaluate the 
relative risk of different portfolios. Estimation of 
systematic risk is thus one of the most important topics in 
investment analysis and has been investigated by many 
researchers. Much of the recent work examines the joint 
decisions of consumption and portfolio allocation using the 
consumption-based capital asset pricing model^?. As with 
most capital asset pricing models, the consumption-based 
capital asset pricing model(CCAPM) relates the expected return 
on an asset to its systematic risk. While the covariance with 
the return on a stock market index may be the standard measure 
27ln the intertemporal model, it is assumed that 
individuals choose consumption and investment policies that 
maximize their expected utilities across possible lifetime 
consumption paths. The techniques of stochastic dynamic 
programming is used to find the best consumption and portfolio 
policies. 
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of systematic risk, the consumption CAPM suggests that a 
better measure is the covariance with aggregate consumption 
growth^®. The consumption beta appears preferable on 
theoretical grounds because the growth rate of consumption is 
a sufficient statistic for the state of the economy^®. 
Recently, several puzzles or paradoxes have been found in 
the financial markets. Those stylized facts include the 
equity premium puzzle^° and the low beta effect, I will 
investigate whether these are also found in land markets. The 
questions I investigate include: In land markets, does there 
exist a low beta effect similar to that found in financial 
markets so that low beta lands earn higher returns than would 
be predicted by the capital asset pricing model? A primary 
implication of any version of the CAPM is that asset with high 
^®Mankiw and Shapiro (1986). 
^^Douglas T. Breeden (1979) provides a key link between 
macroeconomic growth models and financial models of asset 
pricing. 
3°Mehra and Prescott (1985) observed that the equity 
premium for a particular sample averaged about 6%, using the 
Grossman and Shiller (1981) data set. Restrictions that a 
class of general equilibrium model face upon the average 
returns of equity and Treasury bills are found to be strongly 
violated by U.S. data. This is a puzzle because a variant of 
Lucas' pure exchange Arrow-Debreu type economy cannot explain 
the observed differential in the rates of return between two 
underlying assets. Thus the equity premium puzzle in their 
study states, for plausible values of the risk aversion 
coefficient, the difference of the expected rate of return on 
the stock market and the riskless rate of interest rate is too 
large. 
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systematic risk should earn high average return. The second 
issue I address is the equity premium puzzle in the farmland 
market. Specifically, I explore the question: Why is the 
average return on cropshare contracts higher than the average 
return on cashrent contracts in the farmland market? I 
compare the estimated risk premia with the stylized facts of 
persistent deviations between cashrent and cropshare returns. 
The analytical framework for my study of rates of return 
in the land market is based on Peter Barry's (1980) CAPM model 
and Mankiw and Shapiro's (1986) CCAPM model. The analysis 
will be applied to district and state-level data on rates of 
return from the two most used farmland contracts, cropshare 
contracts, and cashrent contracts^i. Risk measures derived 
for the two contracts will provide the basis for answers to 
the questions raised above. 
Part III has the following organization; The literature 
will be reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, the CAPM and 
CCAPM models are summarized. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 contains conclusions and a discussion of 
possible extensions. 
^^As discussed in the section, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
LAND MARKET, at the beginning of dissertation, there are three 
types of farm leases in Iowa; the cropshare contract, the 
cashrent contract (or cash arrangement), and a combination of 
the cropshare and cashrent contract. 
101 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The risk and return to agricultural assets have been 
previously studied, with regard to farmland, by Barry (1980) 
and Irwin, Forster, and Sherrick (1988), and with regard to 
agricultural commodities, Arthur, Carter, and Abizadeh (1988). 
Peter Barry (1980) estimated the risk premium reguired to 
hold farm real estate in a well-diversified market portfolio 
using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). His study uses 
data at the national level and for ten farm production regions 
of the United States. Barry found beta values of .19 for the 
national level and .29 for the corn belt region among others. 
See Table 1. He concluded that agricultural assets are not 
very risky when included in a well-diversified portfolio. In 
interpreting results of low beta values, he mentioned that 
investment in farm real estate at national or regional levels 
contributed little systematic risk to a well-diversified 
portfolio^Z. The insignificant systematic risk associated 
with agricultural assets, including farmland, implies that 
their expected returns should be relatively low. However, 
Barry suggested that returns are not persistently low and that 
32see Peter Barry (1980, p. 552). 
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long-run risk-adjusted returns to farm real estate may have 
been relatively high. 
In principle, the market portfolio contains values of all 
assets that contribute to wealth. However, it is obviously 
not feasible to create such a portfolio. The proxy used by 
Barry was a combined stock, bond, and farm real estate index 
with annual returns to each asset weighted by their 
outstanding market values in each year. 
The interpretations of these results may be limited by 
how well farmland markets actually meet the assumptions of the 
CAPM^s. First, farmers, who are the major holders of 
farmland, may not be well diversified which may bias the beta 
values downward. As already recognized in the subsequent 
literature (for example, Ross (1976)), if the market portfolio 
is not mean-variance efficient then the CAPM cannot be 
sustained. The CAPM is not dynamic but a one-period "static" 
model that cannot encompass issues like economic fluctuations 
and their effects on asset pricing. 
Irwin, Forster, and Sherrick (1988) extended Barry's 
33in the CAPM, asset markets are assumed to be highly 
efficient so that expected returns quickly and fully reflect 
available information; no transaction costs, tax obligations, 
or indivisibilities exist; and lending and borrowing rates are 
equal for risk free assets. Investors are risk averse, well 
diversified, and hold homogeneous expectations. Under these 
conditions, the market portfolio contains values of all assets 
that contribute to wealth. See T. E. Copeland and J. F. 
Weston (1988, Chapter 6). 
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results by considering the effects of uncertain inflation on 
portfolio performance, using a broader market proxy to 
represent U.S. capital markets over time. They revised and 
estimated Barry's model using the lengthened sample period 
(1947-84). The values of the market coefficient increased in 
size compared to Barry's estimate over the 1950-77 sample 
period. However, the market beta estimates are still 
relatively small in magnitude and not significant. The 
inflation coefficient has the positive sign and is 
statistically significant over the sample period as shown in 
Table III.l. They concluded that farm real estate offers only 
a slight premium above those for systematic risk, contributes 
little systematic risk to a well-diversified portfolio, and 
exhibits substantial risk due to uncertain inflation. 
Utilizing the arbitrage pricing theory (APT)^^, Arthur, 
Carter, and Abizadeh (1988) support previous capital asset 
pricing model findings that the estimated risk associated with 
agricultural assets is low. They estimated the CAPM and APT 
relationships for fourteen U.S. farm assets and five nonfarm 
assets, based on quarterly data from 1976 to 1984. They 
estimated the CAPM to ensure that the data used for the APT 
estimation generate CAPM results similar to those found in 
^^This approach presumes that there are other risk 
factors beside B, which can explain risk premia. Usually 
common factors which explain most of variance of portfolio 
returns are selected based on the factor analysis. 
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previous studies. Most of the estimated beta coefficients of 
farm assets are not significantly different from zero at the 
ten percent level except gold, cotton, fruit, tobacco, hay, 
and cornas. They found an insignificant beta value of -.03 
for farmland real estate in the CAPM equation. APT results 
also show that reaction coefficients for farmland are not 
significantly different from zero. They concluded that farm 
assets do not contribute systematic risk to a diversified 
portfolio in both the CAPM and the APT. They mentioned that 
this conclusion is stronger for the APT because it explains 
the relationship between risk and returns better than the 
CAPM. 
The CAPM provides a useful tractable mechanism testing 
asset pricing theory because it produces an interpretable risk 
measure for a risk-return relationship and parsimoniously 
summarizes a great deal of information in a single 
variable^®. However, recent theoretical advances in dynamic 
models of asset pricing have led to the development of more 
sophisticated empirical models of asset pricing including the 
consumption CAPM. 
The relationship between return and risk in farmland 
markets based on the consumption CAPM has not been previously 
^Sgee Arthur, Carter, and Abizadeh (1988, Table 1, p. 362). 
^®See Tallman (1989). 
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investigated. Despite criticism that the distribution of the 
consumption betas relies upon the properties of the state 
variables,37 several authors have conducted empirical studies 
of the consumption CAPM. Recent papers include those by 
Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), Simon Wheatly (1988), and Breeden, 
Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989). Douglas T. Breeden (1979) 
initiated the investigation of additional variables as 
measures of intertemporal risk, and is credited with the 
development of the consumption CAPM. His formulation provided 
a key link between macroeconomic growth models and financial 
models of asset pricing. This connection makes it possible to 
analyze asset determination in a model economy that fluctuates 
over time. In particular, Breeden showed that the growth rate 
of consumption is a sufficient statistic for the state of the 
economy. In other words, all of the state variables need not 
be identified for asset pricing. Thus, aggregate consumption 
should be a better proxy for the return to the market 
portfolio than is the return to a market portfolio. The 
resulting relationship from the CCAPM is an equilibrium asset 
pricing model that uses the growth rate of (real per capita) 
^^For example, Bradford Cornell (1981) argued that the 
consumption model is not free of the restrictions implied by 
Merton's intertemporal model so that direct estimation still 
requires the identification of state variables. He, thus, 
concluded that the conditional distribution of consumption 
betas is random. Bergman (1985) criticized the assumption of 
time-separable preferences in the derivation of the CCAPM. 
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consumption as the benchmark return from which all other 
assets are priced. 
Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger estimated the CCAPM 
after adjusting for measurement problems associated with 
reported consumption data, utilizing a distinction between the 
appropriate theoretical definition of aggregate consumption 
per capita and the consumption reported by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce. The CCAPM evaluates assets with respect to 
changes in aggregate consumption between two points in time. 
In contrast, the available data on aggregate consumption 
provide total expenditures on goods and services over a period 
of time. They pointed out that these differences between 
consumption in theory and its measured counterpart suggest two 
problems; 1) goods and services need not be consumed in the 
same period that they are purchased, 2) measured aggregate 
consumption is closer to an integral of consumption over a 
period of time than to consumption at a single point in time, 
which creates a summation bias^®. Their empirical work 
examined the usefulness of the risk measures in predicting 
expected returns. They concluded that the traditional CAPM 
and the CCAPM performed similarly. 
A recent study by Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), using 
quarterly data from 1959 to 1982, tests and rejects a similar 
^®See Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989, pp. 234-243) . 
107 
version of the consumption-based asset pricing model, 
concluding that the traditional CAPM outperforms the 
consumption CAPM. Specifically, by assuming that a 
representative individual displays constant relative risk 
aversion, they derive an approximate relation for each asset's 
expected real return. In order to test this model, average 
real returns on a large sample of equities are regressed on 
estimates of their market and consumption betas using 
instrumental variables. Based on a large cross-sectional data 
set of equity returns, they found only the slope coefficient, 
on the market beta to be significantly different from zero, 
rejecting a similar version of the consumption-based asset 
pricing models. In other words, their results show that the 
expected real return has a significant linear relationship 
with the market beta but not with the consumption beta. 
However, Simon Wheatley (1988) criticized the inferences 
from Mankiw and Shapiro's results which reject the 
consumption-based asset pricing model because the parameters 
obtained from the instrumental variables estimation differed 
considerably from the ordinary least squares estimates. 
Wheatley suggests that either the instruments are not strongly 
related to the underlying variables of interest or that these 
underlying variables are highly collinear. Wheatley found 
that the CCAPM implications were consistent with the cross-
sectional data, using returns from 40 stock portfolios. 
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Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, and corporate bonds as 
dependent variables. 
Despite CAPM's empirical simplicity and convenience, it 
has overly restrictive assumptions which result in the lack of 
any formal theoretical linkage between real economic 
performance and the behavior of asset prices. Asset markets 
are assumed to be frictionless and information is costless and 
simultaneously available to all investors. It is also assumed 
that there are no market imperfections such as taxes, 
regulations, or restrictions on short selling. Furthermore, 
the CAPM is essentially not dynamic but static. The CAPM is a 
one-period model that cannot easily account for the impacts of 
economic fluctuations on asset pricing. Recent advances in 
the sophistication—Qf-cmp±rix:al tools available for testing 
financial asset pricing theory have allowed models that 
address intertemporal variation in opportunities. However, 
the lack of a consensus opinion on the performance of the CAPM 
versus the CCAPM leads me to use both in analyzing the pricing 
of farmland in Iowa. 
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Table III.l. Alternative asset pricing model estimates 
for farm real estate with cashrent contract 
Barry fl9801 IFS Estimates^ ACA Estimates^ 
Explanatory CAPM One-Factor Two-Factor CAPM APT 
Variables (1950-77) (1947-84) (1976-84) 
Intercept 
Market 
Inflation 
factor 1^ 
factor 2 
factor 3 
factor 4 
r2 
SEE 
DW 
4.78 
(2.53)° 
0.19 
(1.70) 
0 . 2 6  
4.97 
1.82 
4.15 
(1.23) 
0.32 
(1.93) 
0 . 2 8  
6.58 
1.64 
4.40 
(1.73) 
0.25 
(1.49) 
0.86 
(2.37) 
0 . 2 8  
5.72 
1.66 
-0.01 
(-0.65) 
-0.03 
(-0.23) 
0.000858 
0.01011 
0.01094 
0.00345 
0.13 
^ Irwin, Forster, and Sherrick (1988). 
^ Louise M. Arthur, Colin A. Carter, and Abizadeh (1988) . 
° t-statistics are in parentheses. All estimates are 
based on the nominal excess returns defined as the nominal 
rate less the risk-free rate of return. 
^ In APT estimation, first, they performed maximum 
likelihood factor analysis on the covariance matrix of the 
rate of return of 23 assets. Second, based on chi-square 
tests, four common factors, which explain 85% of the variance 
of portfolio returns, were selected. Finally, the sensitivity 
or reaction coefficients were estimated. See Arthur, Carter, 
and Abizadeh (1988, p. 362). 
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3. MODELS 
3.1. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAFH) 
The capital asset pricing model describes the equilibrium 
relationship between asset price and risk. In market 
equilibrium, the CAPM expresses a linear relationship between 
an asset's expected return and its systematic risk as measured 
by the sum of a risk free rate and a risk premium^^. This 
relationship can be described as follows: 
E(Ri) = E(Rf) + [ E(%) - E(Rf)] 
where, 
E(Ri) = expected return on asset i 
E(Rf) = expected return on risk-free asset f 
= risk-free interest rate = Rg 
E(Rj,) = expected return on market portfolio 
Cov(R£,Rjj)= covariance of returns between asset i and 
market portfolio 
= variance of returns for asset i = square of 
standard deviation of return for asset i. 
The general form of the CAPM is 
E(Ri) = Rf + [ E(Rj^) - Rf] 
3*Barry and Baker (1984, pp. 183-199). 
Ill 
where, = Cov(Ri^,Rjj)/Var (Rj^) , the systematic risk of 
asset i. 
The model implies that excess returns (i.e., returns 
beyond Rf) on asset i are expressed as a function of excess 
returns on a market portfolio where measures asset i's 
systematic risk. In other words, the required rate of return 
on any asset is ECR^) which is equal to the risk-free rate of 
return plus a risk premium. The risk premium is the price of 
risk multiplied by the quantity of risk. A of one 
indicates that asset i's value follows the returns on the 
market portfolio. A greater (less) than one indicates 
that i's return magnifies (attenuates) market movements. The 
mean-variance capital asset pricing model restricts each 
asset's expected real return to be a linear function of its 
market beta, while the consumption-based asset pricing model 
restricts it to be a linear function of its consumption beta. 
For empirical analysis, the return on any asset is a linear 
function of the market return plus a random error e^, which is 
independent of the market: 
~ ^Mt ®it' t = 1, ..., T. 
where Rj^^ and R^^; the period t excess rates of return 
relative to the risk free asset for asset i and the market 
portfolio respectively. is the market beta coefficient 
and e^^t is the error term. The empirical counterpart to the 
CAPM, commonly termed the empirical market line is as follows: 
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Rit = @0 + ®i®Mit + ®it' i = 1, 
where Sq = %/ 8i = ER^ - Rp, R^ is the realized return on 
asset i over our sample; and e^ is the expectational error 
Rj^ - ERj^. In this approach, the model relates the return on 
asset i to its systematic risk In contrast to the market 
model, which is a time series expansion, both the intercept 
and the slope are the estimates taken from cross-section data 
each time period^°. 
3.2. The Consumption CAPM 
The representative agent faces choices of how much to 
consume and how much to save. The savings decision involves 
the allocation of his portfolio among various assets such as 
equity, bonds, and land. The agent maximizes a time additive, 
concave expected utility function of the form: 
(1) U(Ci) + (l+p)UE[U(C2)] 
where is (known) first period consumption, Cg is the random 
second period consumption, and p is the rate of subjective 
time preference. Maximization is subject to the intertemporal 
budget constraint given by: 
Ct + PtAt + PftFBt+i = (Pt + dt)At_i + Bt 
4°Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) discussed the problem of the 
sampling error in beta. They pointed out two possible sources 
of measurement error: the error in measuring aggregate 
consumption, and sampling error. See pp. 455-56. 
113 
where is the real price in period t (in terms of period t 
consumption) of a claim to the entire future stream of returns 
on the asset share; A^. is the amount of the asset held in 
period t; d^ is the real period t dividend; and FB^ is the 
risk free asset. Thus the standard first-order conditions 
are: 
(2) (l+p)E[U'(Ct+i)Ri] = U'(Ct), 
or E[R^^S^] = 1, 
(3) Rft(l+P)E[U'(Ct+i)] = U'(Ct), 
where is one plus the rate of return on the ith asset. 
= U'(C:t+i)/(U'(Ct)(l+p)) is the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption next period and consumption this period. 
Using the first order condition equation (2), we can 
derive a relationship between an asset's expected return and 
its covariance with consumption; 
(4) E[Rit] = [ESt]-l(l - Cov(Rit,St)) 
For the constant relative risk aversion case, U(C)=C^~^/1-
A, where A is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk 
aversion, we can approximate the covariance in (4) as 
(5) Cov(Rj^t'St) « [-Y/(l+P)] Cov(Rit' Ct+i/Ct). 
If we consider the two period case and allow two "trees" with 
stochastic second-period payoffs, then the relation (4) can be 
specified as follows: 
(6) E[Rit] = U'(Yi)/(U'(Y2^ + Y22)(1+P)) 
X [1-Cov(Y2^/P, (U'(Y2^ 4- Y22)(l+p))/U'(Yi)], 
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where is the second period payoff from land with a 
cropshare contract; represents the return from other risky 
assets, land under a cashrent contract, or stocks; and P is 
the price of an asset. This relationship (6) is the same 
"consumption beta" expression for the return on any freely 
traded asset that was derived in Barsky (1989). 
To derive the consumption-beta relationship in the land 
market, we combine equation (4) with the approximation (5) to 
get the following equation; 
1 + Rit = ESt'l + A/(l+p){Cov(Ri^t'Ct+i/Ct)/ESt} 
=  E S t " ^  +  A / ( l + p )  X  
{ G o v / E S ^ }  { C o v ( R ^ ^ ,  C ^ + ^ / C ^ )  / G o v ( R ^ t  '  }  
Rearranging the above equation yields 
(7) Ri = 00 + 02fici + vii 
where Rj^ is the realized return on asset i. To distinguish 
land under a cropshare contract and land under a cashrent 
contract, I denote the rate of return from a cropshare 
contract as Rg and the rate of return from a cashrent contract 
as Rg. 
®0 ~ ]-1 ~ ~ ^  Gov(Rj^^, ) / ( ' ^Ci ~ 
{ C o v ( R i t ' ^ t + i / ^ t ) •  E q u a t i o n  ( 7 )  s t a t e s  t h a t ,  
in equilibrium, the expected real return on farmland, in 
excess of the risk-free real rate, must be proportional to the 
covariance of returns to a cropshare contract with real 
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consumption growth. Equation (7) expresses a similar 
relationship involving returns to a cashrent contract. The 
measure of an asset's systematic risk is its covariance with 
consumption growth. We can also derive an equation relating 
the return on assets to the growth rate of consumption, which 
provides a risk and return relationship analogous to equation 
( 2 )  .  
~ ®Ci ®it 
where is the period t excess rates of return on asset i; 
CRct is the growth rate of consumption, C^+i/Cj.; = 
{Cov(Ritf C^+i/Ct)/Cov(Rj4t^Ct+i/Ct) } is a measure of the 
systematic risk of asset i; and e^^^ is the error term. 
The resulting relation is an equilibrium asset pricing 
model that uses the growth rate of (real per capita) 
consumption as the benchmark return from which all other 
assets are priced'*^. 
'^^See Tallman (1989). Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger 
(1989) also use the asset portfolio that has maximum 
correlation with the growth in consumption as the benchmark. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Three major sources of risk in holding farmland are; 
production risk; price risk; and risk in the underlying value 
of land. Because the cashrent contract involves a fixed 
payment at the beginning of the period, there is no production 
or price risk. The cropshare contract, on the other hand, 
does involve price and production risks since the landlord is 
paid a share of net returns per acre. It is important to note 
that the variance of price times quantity will be lessened to 
the extent that increasing quantity decreases price along a 
downward sloping demand curve. There is some potential that a 
cashrent contract involves greater default risk, if rents are 
paid at the end of the period. Thus the risk in holding 
farmland depends on the terms of the contract between land 
owner and renter. Each type of contract should be subject to 
movements in the value of farmland unless there exist 
differential incentives to conserve land productivity across 
the two contracts. 
It is worthwhile to examine the price and production risk 
more carefully. If yields in one region are uncorrelated with 
yields in other regions, then regional yield and price will be 
uncorrelated. The reason is that no one region is large 
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enough to alter market supplies, and hence market prices. On 
the other hand, if high productivity in one region is 
associated with nationwide high productivity, then increasing 
production will decrease prices. This implies that the 
variance of revenue per acre would be less than might be 
expected by examining the variance of prices and the variances 
of quantities independently. There may be differences between 
the cost of enforcing a cropshare contract versus cashrent 
contract. These may also lead to differences in measured 
returns to the two contracts because returns will include 
differential payments for monitoring and information costs 
associated with insuring that the tenant does not shirk under 
the cropshare contract. 
Historically, the average return on land under a 
cropshare contract has exceeded the average return on land 
under a cashrent contract. (See Figure 14 for the comparison 
of rates of return between two contracts at aggregated state-
level, Figures 15 and 16 for representative district-level 
local markets.) The average real annual rate of return on Iowa 
farmland under a cropshare contract over the thirty-six years 
considered was about 8.66 percent (See Table III.3), while the 
average return on land under a cashrent contract reported in 
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Table III.4 was about 8.08 percent per annum^^. This implies 
a higher average equity premium of .58 percent for cropshare 
contracts. This stylized fact presumably reflects the nature 
of risk in the two contracts to the extent that there is 
greater variability in expected returns to cropshare 
contracts. This presumption can be tested by comparing the 
measures of systematic risks between two contracts. 
I computed the mean return, the excess return, the market 
beta (Bjii) , and the consumption beta (fîci) cropshare and 
cashrent contracts for the state of Iowa and for the nine 
cropping districts in the state. Based on these estimations, 
I empirically address the following questions: 1) Does a low 
beta effect exist in Iowa farmland markets? and 2) Can the 
differential in average return between cropshare and cashrent 
contracts be explained by models which associate returns with 
risk in the CAPM and CCAPM? 
4.1. Data and Estimation 
The data used in this study consists of thirty-four time 
series. Annual observations on average real farmland prices 
per acre are available for the state level and for the nine 
districts. Observations on average real cashrents and 
^^Nominal average annual rates of return on lands under 
cropshare and cashrent contracts are about 13.49 and 12.78 
percent, respectively, in Table III.2. 
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cropshares per acre are available for the same units of 
observation. These thirty series are used to measure returns 
to holding farmland in Iowa. The independent variables 
include a measure of market return on equity (the average 
annual real return on the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite 
Index), a measure of risk free return (the real yield on 
government Treasury Bills), and two measures of consumer 
expenditures (real consumer expenditures per capita on non-
durables and on services). These series were used to generate 
the data utilized in this section. Series of farmland prices, 
cashrents, and cropshare rents were used to determine the 
annual real rate of return on land under a cashrent contract 
and under a cropshare contract. The annual return for year t 
was computed as (Pt+i + d^^ " where is the real 
farmland price per acre at time t, and dj^^ is the annual real 
rent from land under contract i. Cashrent is usually paid 
before planting. In order to make two contracts comparable, 
cashrents were adjusted by real interest rates to control for 
differences in the timing of payment. The risk premium is 
calculated as the difference between the real return on land 
under each contract and the real return on a riskless security 
as defined above. 
For the Consumption CAPM, real consumption expenditures 
on services and nondurables were added. The growth rate in 
consumption was computed as the benchmark return from which 
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all other assets are priced. Both the CAPM and the CCAPM are 
estimated first using ordinary least squares. Because returns 
on farmland are subject to supply and demand shocks that are 
likely to be correlated across regions, both the CAPM and 
CCAPM are also estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) estimation method. Both the CAPM and the 
CCAPM model are also estimated by the market line method used 
by Mankiw and Shapiro. I estimate consumption betas directly 
based on the beta coefficient formula in Mankiw and Shapiro, 
which is the ratio of the covariance of the return on land and 
the consumption growth rate relative to the covariance between 
the market portfolio and the growth rate of consumption. 
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Table III.2. Comparison of nominal average annual rates of 
return on farmland under cropshare and cashrent 
contracts 
Nominal Rate of Return 
on Cropshare Contract* 
Nominal Rate of Return 
on Cashrent Contract 
Models Mean (S.D.)^ Mean (S.D.) 
Disaggregate Models 
1. Northwest 
2. Northcentral 
3. Northeast 
4. Westcentral 
5. Central 
6. Eastcentral 
7. Southwest 
8. Southcentral 
9. Southeast 
Aggregate Model 
10. State 
0.1178 
0.1327 
0.1512 
0.1231 
0.1275 
0.1396 
0.1345 
0.1627 
0.1431 
(0.1446) 
(0.1424) 
(0.1315) 
(0.1328) 
(0.1343) 
(0.1160) 
(0.1198) 
(0.1359) 
(0.1339) 
0.1152 
0.1279 
0.1483 
0.1218 
0.1229 
0.1320 
0.1251 
0.1420 
0.1338 
(0.1336) 
(0.1311) 
(0.1204) 
(0.1236) 
(0.1241) 
(0.1079) 
(0.1110) 
(0.1217) 
(0.1210) 
0.1349 (0.1293) 0.1278 (0.1188) 
^ 50/50 cropshare contracts case. 
^ standard deviation. 
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Table III.3. Summary statistics for the average annual rate of 
return on farmland under cropshare Contract 
Real Rate of Return on Excess Return^ 
Cropshare Contract* 
Models Mean (S.D.)° ^ Mean(S.D.) SE 
Disaggregate Models 
1. Northwest 0. 0700(0. 132) 0. 023 0. 0250(0. 140) 0. 024 
2. Northcentral 0. 0843(0. 129) 0. 022 0. 0392(0. 140) 0. 024 
3. Northeast 0. 1022(0. 120) 0. 021 0. 0571(0. 131) 0. 023 
4. Westcentral 0. 0753(0. 121) 0. 021 0. 0303(0. 131) 0. 023 
5. Central 0. 0796(0. 123) 0. 021 0. 0345(0. 134) 0. 023 
6. Eastcentral 0. 0912(0. 106) 0. 018 0. 0461(0. 117) 0. 019 
7. Southwest 0. 0867(0. 114) 0. 019 0. 0415(0. 122) 0. 021 
8. Southcentral 0. 1139(0. 131) 0. 023 0. 0688(0. 143) 0. 024 
9. Southeast 0. 0944(0. 121) 0. 021 0. 0494(0. 133) 0. 023 
Aggregate Model 
10. State 0.0866(0.118) 0.020 0.0415(0.129) 0.022 
^ 50/50 Cropshare contract case. Rate of return on land 
under cropshare contract (Rgt) = (Pt + ^st " where 
P^, dgt are real land price and real 50/50 cropshare rent at 
time t. 
^ Rate of return from land with cropshare contract over 
risk free rate of return measured by the government Treasury 
Bills rates. It is usually called "average equity premium". 
° Standard deviation. 
Standard error of mean. 
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Table III.4. Summary statistics for the average real annual 
rate of return on land under cashrent contract 
Real Rate of Return Excess Return^ 
on Cashrent Contract* 
Models Mean (S.D.)° Mean(S.D.) SE 
Disaggregate Models 
1. Northwest 0 .0673(0. 119) 0. 021 0. 0223(0. 126) 0. 027 
2. Northcentral 0 .0794(0. 116) 0. 019 0. 0344(0. 124) 0. 021 
3 . Northeast 0 .0992(0. 107) 0. 018 0. 0541(0. 115) 0. 019 
4. Westcentral 0 .0737(0. 110) 0. 018 0. 0287(0. 118) 0. 020 
5. Central 0 .0748(0. 111) 0. 019 0. 0298(0. 119) 0. 020 
6. Eastcentral 0 .0835(0. 095) 0. 016 0. 0385(0. 102) 0. 017 
7. Southwest 0 .0769(0. 099) 0. 017 0. 0319(0. 104) 0. 018 
8. Southcentral 0 .0932(0. 111) 0. 019 0. 0482(0. 117) 0. 020 
9. Southeast 0 .0851(0. 105) 0. 018 0. 0400(0. 113) 0. 019 
Aggregate Model 
10. State 0, .0808(0. 105) 0. 018 0. 0358(0. 112) 0. 020 
® Rate of return on land under a cash rent contract (Ret) 
= (Pt + ^ct " where P^, d^^ are real land price and 
real cashrent adjusted for the timing of payment. 
^ Rate of return from land with cashrent contract over 
risk free rate of return measured by the government Treasury 
Bills rates. It is usually called "average equity premium". 
^ Standard deviation. 
^ Standard error of mean. 
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4.2. CAPM Results 
One way to measure risk is by estimating the beta 
coefficient in the CAPM. Assets with high systematic risk 
should earn a high average return. I begin my investigation 
of the cross-sectional returns to farmlands by examining 
whether this positive relation holds for both cropshare and 
cashrent contracts. The CAPM and CCAPM are estimated using 
both aggregate state-level and disaggregated district-level 
time series of the excess of actual returns for land over a 
risk-free return. 
Results in Table III.5 for aggregate state-level returns 
show beta values of -.09 for land under a cashrent contract 
and -.08 for land under a cropshare contract, which are not 
significantly different from zero. Results for disaggregated 
district-level returns also reveal consistently low beta 
values. Cropshare betas range from -.01 in the eastcentral 
district to -.12 in the northwest district. They range from 
-.04 in the eastcentral district to -.13 in the northwest, 
southcentral, and southeast districts in the cashrent contract 
case. None of the district-level market beta estimates differ 
significantly from zero. These results indicate that risks 
measured by market betas are not statistically significant in 
determining the excess rate of return on land over the risk-
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free return, called a risk premium. Low market betas close to 
zero indicate that return on land is not linked to market 
movements. In other words, rates of return on land are 
independent of market returns. Since individual assets in the 
CAPM are assumed to be priced, in equilibrium, to reflect the 
asset's contribution to the risk of a well-diversified 
portfolio, insignificant values of market betas indicate that 
farmland under both contracts have provided premia above those 
needed to compensate for the systematic risk. This result is 
consistent with those of Barry (1980) and Arthur, Carter, and 
Abizadeh (1988). Barry also found an insignificant beta value 
for farm real estate in a CAPM equation. Although the market 
coefficients in this study are lower than Barry's estimates, 
my results confirm Barry's conclusions that farm real estate 
i) offers substantial premia above that required to compensate 
for systematic risk and ii) it contributes little systematic 
risk to a well-diversified portfolio. 
The average return to land under a cropshare contract is 
slightly larger than the average return to land under a 
cashrent contract. The implication from the model is that the 
cropshare market beta should be slightly greater than the 
cashrent market beta. A comparison of market beta estimates 
reveals that cropshare betas are smaller in absolute value. 
Moreover, these differences are of insignificant magnitude. 
This leads to the conclusion that the capital asset pricing 
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model cannot explain the differential in the average returns 
between the cashrent and cropshare contracts. 
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Table III.5. Estimation of CAPM: Market beta estimates 
Panel A: BmsI' Market Betas of Cropshare Contract 
Models OLS a SURb M & S° 
a ®MS a &MS ^MS 
Disaggregate Models 
1. Northwest 0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -0.12 -0. 012 
(1.27)d (-0.99) (-0.59) (-0.95) 
2. Northcentral 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0. 164 
(1.70) (-0.54) (0.51) (-0.55) 
3. Northeast 0.06 -0. 06 0.12 -0. 06 -0. 125 
(2.55) (-0.49) (1.93) (-0.55) 
4. Westcentral 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 —0. 08 -0. 106 
(1.45) (-0.63) (-0.31) (-0.61) 
5. Central 0.04 -0.08 0.08 -0.08 -0. 120 
(1.61) (-0.64) (0.97) ( -0.62) 
6. Eastcentral 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0. 131 
(2.21) (-0.08) (0.53) ( -0.14) 
7. Southwest 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0. 054 
(2.02) (-0.51) (-0.15) (-0.33) 
8. Southcentral 0.07 -0.08 0.05 -0.10 -0. 098 
(2.85) (-0.61) (0.61) (-0.72) 
9. Southeast 0.05 -0.10 0.12 -0.10 -0. 129 
(2.27) (-0.77) (1.55) ( -0.81) 
0.033 0.196® 
Aggregate Model 
10. State 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.08^ -0.159 
(0.02) (0.12) (0.09) (-1.81) 
^ OLS = Ordinary Least Squares. 
^ SUR = Seemingly Unrelated Regression. 
° Mankiw and Shapiro's (1986) empirical market line 
method. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
® System Weighted R^ for SUR. 
^ Estimation of betas from the pooled data. 
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Table III.5. (Continued) 
Panel B: Market Betas of Cashrent Contract 
Models OLS* SUR^ M & S° 
Ot iijic Of ^MC ®MC 
Disaggregate Models 
1. Northwest 0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.13 -0. 122 
(1.25)d (-0.10) (0.33) (-1.17) 
2. Northcentral 0.04 -0.08 0.06 —0.08 -0. 145 
(1.71) (-0.64) (0.82) (-0.74) 
3. Northeast 0.06 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 -0. 119 
(2.82) (-0.74) (2.20) (-0.82) 
4. Westcentral 0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.09 -0. 116 
(1.58) (-0.81) (0.61) (-0.84) 
5. Central 0.03 -0.10 0.11 -0.09 -0. 123 
(1.62) (1.11) (1.57) (-0.84) 
6. Eastcentral 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0. 135 
(2.19) (-0.33) (0.59) (-0.45) 
7. Southwest 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0. 068 
(1.87) (-0.61) (0.13) (-0.58) 
8. Southcentral 0.05 -0.11 0.06 -0.13 -0. 087 
(2.58) (-1.02) (0.87) (-1.13) 
9. Southeast 0.05 -0.13 0.12 -0.13 -0. 145 
(2.32) I (-1.22) (1.86) (-1.30) 
R2 0.036 0.207® 
Aggregate Model 
10. State 0.04 -0.09 0.04 -o.ogf -0 .181 
(1.99) (-0.80) (6.06) (-2.47) 
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4.3. Consumption CAPM Results 
Next I examine the empirical relationship between return 
and consumption beta. In Table III.6, I report results 
analogous to those in Table III.5 for the consumption-based 
asset pricing model. Consumption beta estimates for six of 
the nine regions are positive, but all are less than one in 
absolute value, and no estimates are significant. Results 
indicate that movements in the realized returns on farmland do 
not contribute systematic risk to the path of consumption 
measured by the growth rate of consumer expenditures per 
capita on nondurable goods and services. As with the results 
from the CAPM, the results here do not seem to explain the 
differences in return between cropshare and cashrent 
contracts. In six of the ten cases the cropshare consumption 
beta was greater in absolute value than the cashrent beta for 
SUR estimation. The same was true for three of the cases for 
OLS estimation. 
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Table III.6. Estimation of CCAPM: Consumption beta estimates 
Panel A: ficsi' Consumption Betas of Cropshare Contract 
Models OLS* SUR° M & S° 
^ ®cs ® ^cs ®cs 
Disaggregate Models 
1. Northwest 0.03 -0.13 —0.05 -0.22 -0. 035 
(0.90) ^ (-0.14) (-0.72) (-0.26) 
2. Northcentral 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 -0. 079 
(1.24) (0.05) (0.63) (0.09) 
3. Northeast 0.06 -0.27 0.13 -0.34 -0. 032 
(2.17) (-0.31) (2.06) (-0.42) 
4. Westcentral 0.03 0.20 -0.03 0.21 -0. 162 
(0.91) (0.23) (-0.44) (0.24) 
5. Central 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12 0. 048 
(1.12) (0.08) (0.96) (0.14) 
6. Eastcentral 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.11 -0. 018 
(1.67) (0.22) (0.66) (0.15) 
7. Southwest 0.04 0.13 -0.02 0.23 0. 003 
(1.44) (0.17) (-0.26) (0.288) 
8. Southcentral 0.07 -0.18 0.05 -0.31 0. Oil 
(2.31) (-0.19) (0.62) (-0.32) 
9. Southeast 0.05 0.06 0.13 -0.02 -0. 109 
(1.64) (0.07) (1.62) (-0.03) 
R2 0 .020 0.214® 
Aggregate Model 
10. State 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.02^ -0 . 036 
(1.45) (0.03) (4.33) (-0.09) 
^ OLS = Ordinary Least Squares. 
^ SUR = Seemingly Unrelated Regression. 
^ Mankiw and Shapiro's (1986) empirical market line 
method. 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses. 
® System Weighted R^ for SUR. 
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Table III.6. (Continued) 
Panel B: ficci' Consumption Betas of Cashrent Contract 
Models OLS* SUR^ M & S° 
®cc ®cc 
Disaggregate Models 
1. Northwest 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.23 -0. 035 
(0.87) (-0.11) (0.23) (-0.31) 
2. Northcentral 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 -0. 070 
(1.21) (0.08) (1.03) (0.07) 
3. Northeast 0.06 -0.16 0.13 -0.26 -0. 031 
(2.26) (-0.21) (2.26) (-0.35) 
4. Westcentral 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.15 -0. 118 
(0.95) (0.25) (0.41) (0.20) 
5. Central 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.07 0. 041 
(1.08) (0.10) (1.55) (0.09) 
6. Eastcentral 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.07 -0. 023 
(1.59) (0.14) (0.72) (0.10) 
7. Southwest 0.03 0.14 0.003 0.09 -0. 014 
(1.26) (0.21) (0.04) (0.12) 
8. Southcentral 0.05 -0.23 0.07 -0.51 0. 002 
(2.05) (-0.20) (0.90) (-0.65) 
9. Southeast 0.04 0.06 0.13 —0.06 -0. 150 
(1.56) (0.08) (1.90) (-0.08) 
0.1 316 0.207® 
Aggregate Model 
10. State 0.03 0. 04 0.04 0.12^ -0 .045 
(0.24) (0.74) (4.55) (0.04) 
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4.4. Discussion 
Although study of the consumption CAPM parallels previous 
studies of the traditional CAPM, economic implications from 
these models are quite different from each other. Evidence, 
however, indicates that the models perform similarly because 
there is little difference in results. Given that, I cannot 
conclude which model is better. In all the cases of 
contracts, either 8 estimates are not significantly different 
from zero. The low beta values imply that the returns on 
farmland at the state or regional levels are not tied to the 
overall market. 
The CAPM in this study abstracts from transaction costs, 
tax obligations, indivisibilities, and other frictions. 
Further it is assumed that expected returns quickly and fully 
reflect available information. Actual costs associated with 
the cropshare contract are likely to cause measured returns to 
overstate actual returns. The reason is that the terms of the 
cropshare contract require greater information, confirmation, 
and supervision. The cropshare agreement involves the 
specifications for harvesting, drying, storage, and delivery 
of grain to market. These costs may affect the relative share 
of return on the cropshare contract, depending on the 
bargaining between landowner and renter when developing a 
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lease or contract. Cropshare contracts involve higher 
transaction costs as a whole (sum of negotiation and 
enforcement costs) than the cashrent contract. Given the 
state of risk associated with a particular output, higher 
transaction costs will lead to lower returns to the productive 
assets relative to measured returns which ignore these costs. 
Finally, since the measured cropshare return in this study is 
an empirically constructed contract based on average yields in 
the district across all leased and owned land, it is virtually 
identical to a contract in which the operator rents land to 
himself on a cropshare basis. If owner-operators are more 
productive on their own land (either because they are more 
able farmers or because they have knowledge specific to the 
land they own which makes their decisions more productive) 
then average production on all lands will overstate production 
on cropshare land. This would in turn lead to an upward bias 
in my measure of returns to a cropshare contract. 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The risk-return relationships in farmland markets are 
analyzed empirically to establish the existence or absence of 
effects corresponding to the equity puzzle founded in the 
financial markets. The average return on land under a 
cropshare contract is larger than the average return on land 
under a cashrent contract. Two measures of risk, the market 
beta and the consumption beta, are estimated for two contracts 
used in farmland markets: the cropshare contract and cashrent 
contract. The implication from models employed in this study 
is that the beta for cropshare contracts should be greater 
than the beta for cashrent contracts. However, it is not 
observed that there exist significant differences in betas 
between the two contracts because beta estimates turn out to 
be insignificant. There was little difference in the 
implications when the 6 coefficients were estimated using the 
consumption based capital asset pricing model in place of the 
capital asset pricing model. Both the B estimates are not 
significantly different from zero. This implies that 
farmland under the two contracts contributes little systematic 
risk to a well-diversified portfolio or a path of consumption. 
The finding of small betas in the case of CAPM is broadly 
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consistent with the magnitudes found by earlier studies. I 
also find a small beta in the consumption-based CAPM. As far 
as the equity premium puzzle in farmland markets is concerned, 
the results suggest that neither the CAPM nor the CCAPM can 
account for the differential in the average return between the 
two contracts, based on the return and risk relationship. 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
This dissertation studies three closely related topics in 
land markets: the interrelationship of land prices and land 
rents, the interrelationship of land prices in different 
regions, and the interrelationship of returns to land and 
returns to other assets. 
In Part I, I set up a general model of asset pricing 
following the spirit of the Lucas tree economy. I test the 
present value model in aggregate and disaggregate land 
markets, based on the testable restrictions driven from the 
representative agent dynamic asset pricing model. Based on 
the restrictions, the hypothesis of cointegration between land 
prices and rents is formulated. For the empirical tests, a 
residual-based cointegration test for both the aggregate and 
disaggregate land markets is performed. Test results in Part 
I provide mixed evidence. At the aggregate level, there 
exists evidence of cointegration between land prices and 
cashrents but not for cropshare rents and land prices. When 
both types of contracts associated with land leasing are 
considered, there is stronger evidence of a cointegration 
relationship between land prices and rents. There is less 
evidence of cointegrations at the disaggregate level. One 
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possible explanation of contrasting features of the data is 
that micro bubbles representing local speculation in 
disaggregate markets are washed out in the aggregate market. 
Part II tests the hypothesis of spatial land market 
efficiency. Efficiency implies the existence of a long run 
relationship between land prices in different geographical 
areas. A long-run equilibrium relationship suggests that a 
cointegration relationship should exist across markets. 
Evidence for cointegration was more strongly supported across 
adjacent markets than across distinct markets. The results 
from tests imply that for most cases, levels of land prices 
across markets have a long run equilibrium relationship. These 
evidences seem to be quite favorable to the markets efficiency 
in the spatial sense. 
Part III deals with the risk and return relation in land 
markets. I examine both the consumption beta and market beta 
associated with the returns to cropshare and cashrent 
contracts in land markets. Historically the average return on 
land under a cropshare contract has exceeded the average 
return on land under cashrent. The models employed imply that 
the beta for the cropshare contract should be greater than the 
beta for the cashrent contract. However, I do not observe 
that there exist significant differences in betas between the 
two contracts. The beta estimates are not significantly 
different from zero, indicating that farmland contributes 
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little systematic risk to a well-diversified asset portfolio. 
Neither the CAPM nor the CCAPM can account for the difference 
in the average return between the two contracts, based on the 
return and risk relationship. 
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